

**ASSESSMENT OF THE AMNESTY PROGRAMME AND PEACE
BUILDING ACTIVITIES OF THE NIGER DELTA REGION**

BY

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NSU/GDP/PCS/PhD/0003/17/18**

Ph.D., PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES

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
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
**A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
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STUDIES NASARAWA STATE UNIVERSITY, KEFFI**

**INSTITUTE OF GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
NASARAWA STATE UNIVERSITY, KEFFI**

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this Dissertation has been written by me and it is a report of my research work. It has not been presented in any previous application for a Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) Degree in Peace and Conflict Studies. All quotations are indicated and sources of information specifically acknowledged by means of references.


BALA, Mohammed Abdul
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Date

CERTIFICATION

The Thesis, **Assessment of Peace Building Activities in the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme**, meets the regulations governing the award of Ph.D of the School of Postgraduate Studies, Nasarawa State University Keffi, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge.


Prof. Olayemi Akinwumi
Chairman, Supervisory Committee


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
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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the Almighty Allah for His Mercies, Guidance, Protection and Abundant Blessings.

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I am sincerely grateful to Almighty Allah for his providence, mercy and energy to study and write this research work. To my Supervisors, and particularly Professor Olayemi Akinwumi who doubled as my Supervisor and DVC (Academics) at the same time and now the current Vice Chancellor Federal University, Lokoja, I am profoundly appreciative of the professional guidance, attention, suggestions and intellectual handling that successfully facilitated the completion of this Thesis. For the unrestricted access to your intellectual stock, I remain greatly indebted.

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ABSTRACT

This study examined the effects of the amnesty programme on peace building in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. Despite the implementation of the Amnesty program since 2009, issues of unemployment, insecurity, poverty environmental degradation still remain unaddressed. The study addressed the concept of peace building, conflicts and amnesty programme as well as the amnesty components including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration while Theory of the Post-Colonial State and Conflict Transformation Theory guided the study. The research design adopted was the survey design. The samples used for the study were 400 randomly selected respondents that cut across the Niger Delta Region. The study used primary data from questionnaire and the analyses was done using both descriptive statistics and inferential statistics. The descriptive tools used were tables and percentages while the descriptive tool was the ordinary least square regression analysis. The findings showed that Amnesty Programme and Nature of Amnesty Programme had positive but insignificant effects on peacebuilding in the Niger Delta Region, while Challenges of Amnesty Programme had a negative and significant effect on Amnesty Programme, and mitigation of challenges has a positive and significant effect on peace building in Niger Delta Region. The study recommends among other things that the Federal Government of Nigeria in collaboration with the state governments in the Niger Delta Region should make intensified efforts to improve the implementation, monitoring and control of the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration phases of the amnesty programme in order to have better and statistically significant and positive results towards peace building.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Amnesty programme in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria is designed by the Federal government to address youth's restiveness in the region. Petroleum which happens to be the backbone of Nigerian economy today, was discovered in 1956 and with the commencement of exploration of the resource in Oloibiri in 1959, Nigeria entered into a new era of national development. Unfortunately, the initial optimism that greeted the discovery of crude oil in Nigeria didn't last. Neglect of oil producing communities by successive governments coupled with unprecedented environmental degradation caused by oil spillage, gas flaring and other ecological issues have adversely affected the nation. Ejovi and Ebie (2013) citing Niger Delta Natural Resources Damage Assessment and Restoration Project (2006), affirm that the environmental impact of oil exploration in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria has contributed in no-small measures to the destruction of the fragile ecosystem.

The region is considered to be one of the world's most severely petroleum impacted ecosystems and one of the 5 most petroleum-polluted environment in the World (Oladuro & Oladuro, 2021). Despite the fact that the Nigerian government derives 70 percent of its revenue and up to 90 percent of its foreign earnings from crude oil exploration from the Niger Delta, poverty level in the region is ranked among the highest in Nigeria. According to Watts (2008) as cited in Oluduro and Oluduro (2012), almost 90 per cent of the local

inhabitants of the Niger Delta fall below the poverty line of \$1 dollar per day as they depended on the aquatic resources for their livelihoods. Catastrophic ecological situation of the Niger Delta region, which a direct negative effect of crude oil exploration activities in the region, has virtually destroyed the area's aquatic resources. Crude oil exploration brought countries like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates wealth and prosperity but for Nigeria, the biggest oil producing country in Africa, crude oil exploration is said to have not yet brought the desired results like the other countries mentioned (Oladuro & Oladuro, 2012).

The Niger Delta crisis has been a major threat to both socio-economic activities in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. At present, the amnesty programme is 10 years since its implementation in the Niger Delta as the Federal Government of Nigeria through the amnesty package had good intentions for granting militants amnesty with the hope that the gesture would effectively put an end to youths' restiveness in the region. Amnesty therefore is a guarantee of exemption from prosecution and pardon from punishment for certain criminal, rebel and insurgent actions hitherto committed usually against the state. It indemnifies affected persons in terms of safety and protection from punitive actions, retributions and associated losses. An amnesty most often time is usually within a specific time within which offenders admit crime and take advantage of the general pardon (Ikelegbe, 2010).

With the emergence of a pan-Niger Delta militia group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in 2006, the struggle for local control of Nigeria's oil assumed a more violent dimension with clearly articulated grievances namely Environmental Insecurity and Socio-Economic Marginalization of the Niger Delta people, sundry groups emerged in the Niger Delta as well. Some of these groups, it would appear, were driven not by liberation ideology but crime and criminality. Independently the activities of these groups created a difficult security challenge in Nigeria's oil belt (Aaron, 2010). Oil installations were attacked and oil workers particularly expatriate staffs were taken hostage for ransom. All these were happening, in spite of the heavy presence of the Joint Task Force (JTF), comprising of the Navy, Army and Air force, who were sometimes over run by the superior fire power of the militants (Aaron, 2010). The implications of this parlous security were grave. Oil production figures plummeted to all time low, as many TNCs announced production shut-ins. Specifically, average production figure for 2009 was around 1.6million barrels per day(bpd), down from 2.7million bpd(NNPC,2009). The country lost an estimated \$92 billion in oil export earnings to production shut-in and crude oil theft associated with the activities of militants (Davis, 2009). The cumulative effect of this was a drastic fall in the country's oil exports. Consequently, public finance was subjected to one of the worst crises since independence.

The late President Umaru Yar'Adua, on 25th June, 2009, announced an amnesty for militants who were willing to surrender their arms. The amnesty

programme was in phases: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Aaron (2010). Disarmament of militants entailed the physical removal of the means of combat from ex belligerents (weapons, ammunition). Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed groups, followed by processing of individual combatants in temporary centres with provision of support packages. Reintegration entails the process of reintegrating former combatants/militants into civil society ensuring against the possibility of a resurgence of armed conflict (Nwachukwu and Pepple, 2011).

It is on this note that in 2008, following the submission of Ledum Mitee reports with other recommendations, the Federal Government after consultation with the council of States and in pursuant with section 175 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria granted unconditional pardon to all persons who have directly or indirectly participated in the commission of offences associated with militants activities in the region. The amnesty was proclaimed on 25th June, 2009 included forgiveness and automatic freedom from any form of prosecution whatsoever which was expected to run for a 60 day period from August 6th to October 4th, 2009, (Idonor, 2009, Ikelegbe & Umokoro, 2014). During this period, opportunity was given to ex-agitators to surrender their arms and ammunitions in exchange for presidential pardon. The declaration of the Federal Government amnesty was welcomed by a large section of the society and groups, including several international bodies pledge their supports for the programme. Thus securing lasting peace in the

crisis prone region has not been easy as several peace-building efforts aimed at resolving violent agitations in the Niger Delta have failed. But as part of his efforts, Late President Musa Yar'Adua offered state pardon to the militants in a nationwide broadcast that:

The offer of amnesty is predicated in the willingness and readiness of the militants to give up all illegal arms in their possession completely renounce militancy in all its ramifications unconditionally, and depose to an undertaking to this effect. It is my fervent hope that all militants in the Niger Delta will take advantage of this amnesty and come out to join in the quest for the transformation of our dear nation: (Federal Government of Nigeria, 2009).

Also, the Federal Government proclamation of unconditional amnesty for Niger Delta ex-agitators included the willingness and readiness for them to surrender their arms and ammunitions on or before the expiring date October 4th 2009. So far, 30,000 ex-agitators have accepted the FG amnesty programme. In pursuant to the letter, the Federal Government also instituted a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) package for those who embraced amnesty before the deadline with a 65,000 monthly stipend being paid to ex-militants who accepted the offer of amnesty (Kuku, 2012).

Federal government amnesty programme in the oil-rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria is a programme designed by the government to address youth's restiveness in the region. Unfortunately, the initial optimism that greeted the discovery of crude oil in Nigeria didn't last. Neglect of oil producing communities by successive governments coupled with unprecedented

environmental degradation caused by oil spillage, gas flaring and other ecological issues have adversely affected the nation. The region is considered to be one of the world's most severely petroleum impacted ecosystems and one of the 5 most petroleum-polluted environment in the World.

Despite the fact that the Nigerian government derives 70 percent of its revenue and up to 90 percent of its foreign earnings from crude oil exploration from the Niger Delta, poverty level in the region is ranked among the highest in Nigeria.

Oil exploration activities in the region, has virtually destroyed the area's aquatic resources. Not much of the money derived from the sales of crude oil was used for the development of the country as a result of corruption. Late Chinua Achebe, asserted that Nigeria lost as much as \$ 400 billion in forty years to corruption. (The Punch, 12th January, 2012 pg 3). Series of corruption scandals that are being exposed in Nigeria by President Muhammadu Buhari is a clear indication that the figure could even be much higher than that.

Instead of addressing the issue of under development of oil producing area and official corruption, Nigerian maximum ruler, late General Sanni Abacha decided to hang environmental activists from the Niger Delta region - Ken Saro - Wiwa and eight of his kin-men. The brutal killing of these Nigerians irked the people of the region and sparked off violent agitation. Watts (2006) is of the opinion that Nigerian situation is: an exemplar of the failure of oil-

based development. Central to this analysis is the emergence of new forms of armed insurgency in the oil producing Niger Delta that has rendered the entire area virtually ungovernable, increasingly so since the emergence in late 2005 of a new armed group MEND (the Movement for the Emancipation of the Nigeria Delta).

The government of Nigeria could no longer ignore the Niger Delta question mostly because over the years, crude oil gradually became the backbone of Nigerian economy by giving the nation about ninety percent of its external earning. At the peak of youth restiveness in the Niger Delta, crude oil production fell to all time low of 700,000 barrels per day. This is because the Niger Delta youths actively engaged in vandalism of oil installations, kidnappings of oil workers, bunkering activities and other vices thereby disrupting exploration process in the region. After much deliberation, the government of Late Umar Ya'Adua decided to adopt a new policy called ""Presidential Amnesty Programme" that would help to proffer solution to the menace of violence in the Niger Delta. Imongan (2015) asserts that: One of the efforts by Late President Yar'Adua administration was his good intention to address the agitation in the region by granting unconditional amnesty to militants hoping the gesture would effectively stop the ranging restiveness in the oil bearing area. Crude oil production reached it all time height of 2.6 million barrels per day. Imongan (2015:12) confirms that:

The Federal Government through the Presidential Amnesty Programme is to manage, supervise and implement the amnesty programme. At the end of the 60 days period on October 4, 2009, a total of 20,192 repentant militants surrendered their arms and ammunitions to the Federal Government and accepted the programme. In November 2010, another 6,166 ex-agitators were enlisted into the PAP this constituted the second phase and brought the number of persons enlisted to 26,358. More importantly, in 2012 the Federal Government also approved the inclusion of 3,642 transformed ex-agitators who were excluded in both the first and second phases, bringing the total number of ex-militants to 30,000 that have so far embraced and accepted the amnesty programme proclaimed by the Federal Government.

Nonetheless, ten years now into the amnesty programme there are fears bearing in mind the method of implementation that sustainable peace may not be realized when the programme comes to an end. However, the post-conflict era of the Niger Delta region has witness various kinds of social unrest which has hampered development ranging from kidnapping, illegal oil bunkering, piracy, bombings, disruption of pipeline facilities and other crimes. Therefore, this study seeks to examine the amnesty programme in Nigeria, the impact and challenges in post conflict Niger Delta of Rivers and Delta State.

Below is the *Demography, Social & Economic status of the Niger Delta Region*

9 States 185 LGAs	Lithoral Niger Delta: Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo and Rivers while Extended Niger Delta are: Abia Imo, and Ondo – all oil producing states.
Population	32 million (22% of total Nigerian population), 2/3 under 30 year of age
Population density	265 people per km ² , 13, 329 settlements, 94% with < 5,000 population
Ethnic groups/languages	40 main ethnic groups; around 120 mutually unintelligible languages and dialects
Land area	112,000km ² of land area is oil affected; core delta is 75,000km ²
Ecological zones	Coastal barrier sandy ridge; mangrove swamp; freshwater swamp; lowland rainforest
Natural Resources	Petroleum, natural gas, tin, lead, coal, zinc, arable land
Livelihoods	Agriculture and fishing (48%); trading (17%); services (10%); Education/health (7%)

Social/Economic Indicator	
Infant mortality rate	120 per thousand (Nigeria: 100 per thousand)
Unemployment	Estimated youth unemployment (ages 15-24); 40% Official average for the South-South: 24% (2006)
Poverty	43% in relative poverty (2004); 75% perceive themselves as "poor"
Water	76 to 80% in rural areas and 50 to 55% in urban areas do not have access to safe drinking water
Energy	Firewood is the primary energy source for 73% 34% of population has access to electric power, when available
Crude oil production, mid-2011	About 2.3 mbpd (including condensate); 3.2 mbpd installed capacity; supplies 95% of Nigeria's export earnings and 80% of federal government revenue On average, 25% of production was shut in due to violence or sabotage (2006-2009), at times up to 65%. Production fell from 2.6 mbpd in February 2006 to 1.3 mbpd in May 2009, during a major clash between combatants and the military before the Amnesty
Main international operators and principal Nigerian companies' all have onshore operations except ExxonMobil	Shell (Shell Petroleum Development Company, Nigeria, Ltd); Chevron (Chevron Nigeria, Ltd.). ExxonMobil (Mobil Producing Unlimited). Ent (Nigerian Agip Oil Company), Total (Elf) (Total E&P Nigeria Limited, formerly EPNL).
Main terminals/offshore platforms	Bonny Island (Shell), Brass River (Eni/Agip), Escravos (Chevron), Forcados (Shell), Kwa Iboe platform (Mobil), Odudu platform (Total), Pennigton (Chevron), etc.
Oil reserves	36 billion barrels – 11 th in the world, 2 nd in Africa, estimated reserve life for 41 years
Natural gas reserves	187 trillion cubic feet – 7 th largest gas reserves in the world
Oil/gas pipelines & fields	Over 7,000km of pipelines; 606 oil fields
Gas plants/LNG	30; NLNG Plant with 6 trains; 2 LNG plants in construction in Brass and Olokola
Environment	1986 – 2003: 50,000 acres of mangrove forest disappeared Q1 2010: 32% of associated gas flared (127 bcf)

Source: Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta ISBN 1 – 933549 – 76 – 9 (PB)

1.2 Statement of Problem

Since 2009 amnesty programme and peace building has been implemented for an estimated 30,000 former militants from the Niger Delta, with the view to achieving enduring peace in the oil producing states. The basic components of the program include disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). This conflict management strategy, though laudable, issues of socio-economic reconstruction still remain grossly unaddressed and cast shadows of doubt about government's sincerity to drive the peace process through.

This rising cases of unemployment, environmental degradation, poverty and underdevelopment in the midst of abundant oil wealth has increased the grievances of the Niger Delta people. For this reason, there have been several forms of local peaceful protests since the 1960s which later became transformed into a violent struggle following the lack of an adequate response from the government. The early peaceful struggles notably include the Isaac Adaka Boro-Twelve Day Revolution in 1967, which was brutally crushed by the state and the Ken Saro Wiwa led demonstrations in the 1980s, which placed particular focus on environmental degradation. Indeed, Saro-Wiwa's struggle introduced a new phase of protest which attracted significant international support. Unfortunately, all these efforts were discountenanced by Nigeria's federal government. Saro-Wiwa was subsequently implicated and executed with eight other Ogoni activists. They were accused of allegedly inciting the youth which resulted in the killing of four Chiefs in the region. As a result, the inability of the federal government and the oil multinationals to

appropriately address the situation radically changed the character of the protest from a peaceful to a violent conflict (Ojakorotu 2008; Ukiwo 2007).

The conflict in the areas has become further aggravated in recent years. In 2008, President Yar'Adua set up a technical committee to collate the reports of previous committees that had been set up to resolve the conflict in the Niger Delta region. Part of the report contained the provision to grant amnesty to those involved in the conflict. Consequently, in a bid to finding a lasting solution to the violence in the Niger Delta, president Yar'Adua granted amnesty in 2009 to the militants and to all those who were overtly or covertly involved in the conflict in the Niger Delta region (Technical Committee report 2008). Amnesty is a home-grown conflict resolution programme which is aimed at disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of the Niger Delta militants into society. It is preceded by amnesty, to set a condition for confidence building among the people and the government, thereby preparing the ground for post-conflict peace-building.

The Amnesty programme granted to the militants of Niger Delta has drawn the attention of writers. Ibaba (2011), and Egwemi (2010) argued that, the amnesty initiative, though a unique approach, does not have what it takes to answer the Niger Delta question. Olatoke and Olokooba (2012) argued that the amnesty programme is yet to be passed into law and as such unconstitutional. Smoke (2009) opined that managers of the Nigerian system should develop strategies to deal with the post amnesty challenges and that all

appropriately address the situation radically changed the character of the protest from a peaceful to a violent conflict (Ojakorotu 2008; Ukiwo 2007).

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stakeholders need to be involved in actualizing the implementation of the post amnesty programme. Aluede (2012) argued that the way the programme has been implemented to cost several billion Naira to benefit a few people who have committed crimes against the state is wrong.

1.3 Research Questions

The study empirically answers the following questions:

- i. What is the nature of the Amnesty Programme in the Peace Building Activities of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria?
- ii. How does the Amnesty Programme impact on the Peace Building Activities of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria?
- iii. What are the challenges encountered by the Amnesty Programme on the Peace Building Activities of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria?
- iv. What are the ways by which the challenges encountered by the Amnesty Programmes on the Peace Building efforts can be mitigated in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The main objective of the study was to assess the amnesty programme and peace building activities in the Niger delta region of Nigeria. More specific objectives include to:

- i. assess the nature of the Amnesty Programme in the Peace Building Activities of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria;
- ii. evaluate how Amnesty Programme impacts on the Peace Building Activities of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria;

- iii. examine the challenges encountered by the Amnesty Programme on the Peace Building Activities of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria; and
- iv. determine the ways by which the challenges encountered by the Amnesty Programmes on the Peace Building efforts can be mitigated in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria?

1.5 Research Hypotheses

H₀₁: The nature of the amnesty programme has no significant effect on the peace building activities in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria.

H₀₂: The amnesty programme has not impacted positively on the peace building activities in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria.

H₀₃: The challenges encountered by the amnesty programme have no significant effect on the peace building activities in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria.

H₀₄: The measures taken to mitigate the challenges encountered by the amnesty programme have no significant effect on the peace building activities in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria

1.6 Significance of the Study

While previous studies on amnesty in Nigeria such as Egwemi (2010), Ibaba (2011), and Olatoke and Olokooba (2012) to mention a few, dealt with the process of disarmament, demobilisation and training, there are scant studies that explore the reintegration aspect of the programme because most of the ex-militants are still undergoing training. The study therefore attempts to examine the reintegration process under the amnesty deal, and further assess the

development efforts of the state in addressing the root causes of the conflict. This is with a view to critically examining the effectiveness of amnesty in sustaining the current peace in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, and to determine if amnesty in Nigeria can achieve the same successes recorded in countries where it has been initially adopted.

The research has both theoretical and practical significance. Theoretically, this study will contribute to the scholarly debate on the amnesty programme granted to the Niger Delta militants and effects on national security in Nigeria. This study explores the amnesty programme whose dynamics either impacts or transforms the lives of the people of the Niger delta region in Nigeria. It will also investigate the amnesty programme as panaceas for peace in the Niger delta region. Practically, the outcome of this study will be instrumental to socio-economic and political development of the Niger Delta in particular and the Nigerian state in general, it will help the policy makers to reposition, complement or change the strategies and methods of intervention in the Niger Delta so as to achieve maximum results. Finally, if the study succeeds in clarifying issues and facilitating understanding, it will enrich the pool of literature on the Niger Delta to the benefit of researchers and students.

1.7 Scope of the Study

The time frame of this research covers the period of 2009 -2018. This period is chosen because of its democratic nature and the intense conflicts that characterized the Niger-Delta which resulted to the evolution of amnesty

program. Also, it is a period in which there was increased in the revenue allocation to the Niger-Delta region from the thirteen percent derivation, the creation of Ministry of Niger-Delta Affairs and the Amnesty Programme.

The geographical space covered by the study is the littoral states (Niger-Delta) in general but with reference to four states, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Rivers. Two local governments were selected each from Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa and Delta while three local governments from Rivers state, given a total of nine local governments. However, Akwa-Ibom state is chosen because at present it is the highest oil revenue (derivation) earner among the oil-bearing states. Bayelsa state is chosen because it is the smallest state in the entire country in terms of land mass and population but its (derivation) revenue is the highest in terms of per capita income and can compete favorably with smaller African countries. Besides, the highest debt profile of the states requires special attention. Out of the 5.6 trillion domestic and foreign debts accrued to Nigeria, Bayelsa has more than 20 % of the debt despite being the second revenue earner in the country according to DMO 2012 report. As for the Rivers state, it has the highest population statistically among oil bearing states with conflicting interest with other oil bearing states and has the highest inter and intra-class conflict (DMO, 2012),

The specific issues, programmes and challenges addressed in this study include analysis of revenue allocation to Niger-Delta states from the Federation Account during the period under review and its management in terms of

amnesty programme. NDDC and Ministry for Niger-Delta Affairs as well as development programmes on education, health, electricity, agriculture and water supply. Actual funds released versus estimated expenditure in all cases by the states and local governments were also investigated.

It's also need to be highlighted that in the cause of the research work there were certain constrain encountered. These include: the bureaucratic bootless and lukewarm attitude of the public servants in the ministry of Niger Delta and its Agencies for the release of information which they considered as classified and top government secrets.

There was also the problem of language of communication during the field work. English language was not sufficient at times "pidgin English" and local dialect like Etche ,ikwere, uroboh etc have to be employed with the aide interpreters.

The field work involved movement within the identified littoral state, needless to say that these areas are mostly the creeks, thus movement was not easy yet are necessary in order to have contacts and hear the stakeholders perspectives.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Conceptual Framework

2.1.1 Concept of Peacebuilding

Boutros Boutros-Ghali first conceived of post-conflict peace-building as a framework for ensuring that violent conflict would not reoccur in post-conflict settings. The process originated as a response to the Brahimi Report, which explicitly linked the peacekeeping, peace-building, and socioeconomic development functions of the United Nations (UN) system. This was later elaborated by Kofi Annan (Knight 2008). The UN adopted “peace-building” as part of its official discourse in 1992, when former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali used the term in his Agenda for Peace. In Boutros-Ghali’s view, peace-building was an activity to be undertaken immediately after the cessation of violence. In his words, it was ‘an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’ (Boutros Boutros-Ghali cited in Knight, 2008:24). Knight (2008) concludes that from this conceptualization of peace-building, one can easily discern the early outlines of what later became known as the DDR process. In his words:

From this time onwards, the UN has adopted the DDR process as an indispensable element of post-conflict peace-building; this has been utilized in various peacekeeping missions of the UN. The sole aim is to enhance internal security and build human capacity, and thereby to ensure that sustainable peace

spillover of conflicts across borders; identifying and resettling foreign ex-combatants, including children and women; supporting national disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs; promoting sensitization programs within communities; and meeting specific needs of women, children, and disabled ex-combatants (Knight 2008, p.29). DDR programs do not have a single definition. Isaczai (2006) argues:

That integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (IDDR) principles assert that the reintegration of former combatants should be the essential focus and objective of DDR programming and should involve national ownership, capacity development, and be situated within the larger recovery strategy, from the support of individuals, to the community at large (2006 cited in Obi 2014, p.251).

From the perspective of the UN Secretary-General (1992), discussing the background to conflict in Africa, in most of the insurrections in Africa, irregular militia groups and large numbers of soldiers are recruited (which includes both children and women). This conflict has also included the proliferation of lethal weapons, mostly small arms and light weapons (SALW). It is therefore argued that this group of people requires special attention since they portend a threat to the peace process and could also undermine progress towards the development of security (UN Agenda for Peace 1992).

2.1.2 Concept of Amnesty

Amnesty policy is not new to the world. According to Ikelegbe & Umokoro (2014) cited in Imongan (2015): the word amnesty is a Greek word derived

from "amnesia" which is an act of grace by which the supreme power in a state restores those who may have been guilty of any offence against it to the position of innocent persons (*Novus homo*) and it includes more than pardon, in as much as it obliterates all legal remembrances of the offences. It is also the act of authority by government in which pardon is granted to persons especially for political offences, and release from guilt or penalty of an offence. There are various kinds of amnesty programmes. There is what is called tax amnesty which provides delinquent taxpayers with a one-time opportunity to clear their accounts by paying taxes and interest without being subject to criminal penalties. Tax amnesty could assist governments' revenue generation drive and it may at the same time end up to anger law abiding tax payers who dislike seeing tax defaulters given tax breaks (Leonard & Zeckhauser, 1987).

An amnesty is an exoneration and pardon from punishment for certain criminal, rebel and insurgent actions committed usually against the state and society. An amnesty is always backed by law and has a specified period of time for the assumed offenders to admit the offence and accept pardon. Amnesty guarantees an interregnum of peace, cessation of hostility and a state of unsecured quiet which necessitates a post conflict scenario for peace building. Post conflict transition ensures comprehensive changes in terms of structures, institutions, orientations and attitudes. It is very sensitive and involves socio-political engineering, economic recovery and military and security interventions. Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbarn (2006) have found that post conflict economic

growth and economic recovery for example reduces substantially the risk of conflict reversion. Unresolved grievances, poverty, decay of trust, intention and confidence and unfocused leadership are among the factors which can cause relapse to conflict. Post conflict reversion is very costly and dreadful. Stages in the management of post conflict transition to peace are sequentially disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. (DDR).

Peace building is an all-encompassing whole process of facilitating and strengthening enduring peace. According to Fisher et al (2000) peace building involves “understanding programmes designed to address the causes of conflict and the grievances of the past and to promote long term stability and justice”. It is an effort to ensure socio-political and economic stability of the society. Peace building is proffering durable solution to a conflict ridden society to achieve durable peace. They further stated that peace building does not only address conflict behaviours but more importantly the underlying context behaviours that gave rise to violence. (The causes and triggers).

2.1.2.1 Concept of Disarmament

Disarmament is a form of weapons control strategy both at production and circulation. In a post conflict society, it is the surrender of arms by ex-combatants at designated sites or camps which signifies end to fighting. Disarmament is essentially a military operation, designed to manage the instruments of violence (arms and ammunition) such that a secure and stable environment (Gwinyayi, 2007) is made possible for post conflict transition and implementation of peace agreements. The success of disarmament is

determined first by the quantity of arms surrendered in relation to the estimated stockpiles and available arms, secondly by ensuring inaccessibility of arms and arms flow which guarantees no possibility of rearmament. While disarmament controls the physical tools of violence, demobilization controls the human tools of violence. Disarmament entails the physical removal of the means of combat from ex-belligerents (weapons, ammunition, etc). Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes. The United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations (UNDPKO) defines disarmament as the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population.

According to UNDPKO, DDR activities are crucial components of both the initial stabilization of war-torn societies as well as their long-term development. As such, need for disarmament. The UNDPKO notes that the objective of the DDR process is to contribute to stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin. Through a process of removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of the military structures, and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society, DDR seeks to support ex-combatants so that they can become active participants in the peace process.

Fusato (2003) argues that the three phases of DDR are interconnected, and the successful completion of each phase is essential to the success of the others.

According to him, the goals of DDR are both short term and long term. The immediate short-term goal is the restoration of security and stability, through the disarmament of warring parties. Progressive disarmament reduces the mistrust that fuels a security dilemma between the fighting factions, allows aid workers to intervene more effectively, and allows peaceful social and economic activities to resume.

2.1.2.2 Concept of Demobilization

Demobilization is the first step of transition from combat and militarized life to civilian life. It involves dismantling and disbandment of non-state fighting forces and paramilitary forces that are usually assembled in camps for a change of life orientation. The transition process is usually managed through pre-discharging and post-discharging orientations which includes counselling on non-violent life and life career. Disarmament and demobilization are part of a military process but reintegration is a civilian process and the overall success depends on the proper execution of each phase.

Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion (Nwachukwu & pepple, 2011). According to them, Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization

but prior to the longer term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short term education, training, employment and tools. Demobilization of armed groups is another fundamental short step in the improvement of security conditions at the end of an armed conflict.

The role of demobilization in any post-conflict scenario is always to bring back ex-militants to purely civilian life. After disarmament, ex-militants received a stipend of N65000 monthly allowance (at 1500 per day) and the payment would last till the end of their reintegration, depending on the careers opted for (Amnesty office, 2010). The allowance serves as reinsertion package to divert their minds away from militant attitudes. In addition to the payment of allowances, accommodation arrangements were made for registration and training purposes in six designated areas in the region (collection of personal information), namely; two in Aluu, Rivers State, two in Agbarho, Delta State and two in Uyo, Akwa Ibom State. Beyond their role as rehabilitation/training centres, the sites also served as a refuge to most ex-militants ostracized in their communities. In all, no separate arrangement was made for the under-aged (less than 18) ex-militants among them (Oluwaniyi, 2011).

2.1.2.3 Concept of Reintegration

Reintegration involves the absorption of ex-combatants into the society through gainful training and empowerment. It is geared towards economic independence and self-empowerment as well as peaceful and civil roles of ex-

combatants in the society. Reintegration addresses the specific needs of ex-combatants by offering support in terms of skills development, education, professional training, micro credit and assistance to return to peaceful and sustainable livelihoods. It is broader than disarmament and demobilization cutting across economic and social life of the demobilized persons. Reintegration goes far beyond ex-combatants to include war veterans, families and communities of ex-combatants and veterans and disabled combatants. It takes years to achieve reintegration.

The present difficulty lies in discussing how much the amnesty programme has achieved. Some scholars who wrote at the early stage of the amnesty were of the opinion that the Promised Land is near or has been reached, maybe because of the unsecured quiet it produced. Latter writers came to identify certain lapses especially in the implementation process and funding that will limit the amnesty from achieving its purpose. This study shares this opinion and believes that it is only a thing of time for the region to revert to open violent conflict. This position may be judged and considered pessimistic, cynical, hasty, rash and tendentious but present conditions and events are more attuned to this stance. Except urgent efforts are made to refocus the drifting programme on the right course, again, it is only a thing of time for the region to revert to open violent conflict.

The amnesty programme is now on the third stage of transition which is reintegration but what is worrisome is the success of disarmament and demobilization because the overall success is dependent on the success of each.

Other worries include the legality of the amnesty, who and who are truly the militants? The amnesty is not backed by law or even a gazette meaning it is not an established policy. It is only a presidential proclamation without any legal status and in Nigeria where there is no policy continuation by succeeding governments what happens to amnesty and the militants when a new president assumes power. Imagine it! The militants have openly accepted criminality, but their assumed pardon has no legal backing therefore they are liable to punitive justice.

It was in a sense, a form of surrender without losing the low intensity war. It was a great show of statesmanship by the president, a massive gamble on the path of government and a big risk taken by militants. This in essence is the greatest weakness and vulnerability of the programme. A surrender without defeat and without negotiated agreements and substantial efforts at address and resolution of grievances and problems that root the conflict, is an imposed and fragile peace that is highly susceptible to pushes beyond the precipice

Again, the amnesty is one sided. The amnesty should also be for the Joint Task Force who equally engaged in criminal, atrocious and inhumane acts tantamount to crime against humanity in the Niger Delta. The military operations have been harassments, human rights abuses, brutality, rape, torture, arrests and detentions, extortion, plundering and destruction of properties. In Odi, Gbaramatu, Ogoni, Odioma, Choba, Ikon, Ikenyan and Umuechem all have suffered these forms of assault, criminality and violence from the government security forces. The attack on Odi in 1999 was estimated to have

killed about 2,483 persons and displaced 20,000 people (Ukaogo, 2010). This is more than the number of deaths per annum in low intensity armed conflicts involving open hostilities. Therefore the amnesty is supposed to extend to these military personnel who have rudely indulged in crimes against innocent civilians.

Concerning the funding of the amnesty programme, there is a juxtaposed opinion of underfunding and over funding. However, it will be appropriate to share the latter opinion and amend the former. The amnesty is not underfunded but has been inappropriately funded leading to delays, diversions and reductions of the stipulated amounts. This is not under funding. In fact, the programme appears to be a new largess, lucrative business for militant leaders, NGOs and politicians alike. While in camps they were paid N 1,500 per day feeding allowance and N 20,000 per month for a maximum of three months for the period of demobilization. This monthly stipend has since been increased to N 65,000. Comparatively, graduates in National Youth Service Corps orientation camp are fed on N 100 per meal three times a day and for the twelve months of service are paid about N 19,975 per month, thus the amnesty is not in any way underfunded. This is about the militants not to talk about their leaders who have become billionaires overnight.

However, the above does not suggest under funding but reckless and senseless spending which has created problem for the amnesty. The amnesty has sharply deviated and has culminated into bribery of militants for peace. The effect is already manifesting as many jobless youths in the region and outside have

taken the title of ex-militants and are agitating to partake in the amnesty banquet. Apart from the 6,166 militants who were incorporated into the programme in November 2010 after the October 4, 2009 deadline another 3,642 persons have formed the third phase making up the number to 30,000 ex-militants now in the programme (Ibid. 38-39). This is a product of over funding and deviation from the objectives of the programme. It will not be a surprise that fourth, fifth and sixth batches will soon follow. Opeyemi (2012: 79) states “this has made even the non-militant youths to begin to indulge in militancy in order to become beneficiaries of such economic packages that accompany the amnesty programme”. In a way it supposes that the Nigerian government after all is well buoyant to pay unemployment benefits to the Nigerian unemployed youths even if it is N 5,000 per month.

Another problem with the amnesty is that it tends to have a narrow scope perception of the agitation that is only based on militancy. Conflict transformation does not centre on people alone but also rehabilitates the torn community. The entire programme has been haphazardly designed, packaged and implemented. It is obvious that the programme has been ad hoc and has lacked a consistent permanent structure. The rehabilitation of the environment destroyed communities and even other members of the community who are not ex-militant are not part of the programme. For the government, the amnesty is a success since daily oil production is at its peak but the root grievances remain unattended and the region undeveloped. On Tuesday February 21, 2012 the

petroleum resources minister, Mrs. Diezani Alison-Madueke in a keynote address stated;

The nation's actual crude oil (+condensate) production rose to an average of 2.39 million barrels per day, consistently maintained above the budgeted production level of 2.30 million bpd... similarly gas sales rose by more than 70% to an average 4 billion standard cubic feet per day in 2011 and for the first time, industry supplied more domestic gas than was consumed by the power and industry sector. The Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas Company (NLNG) had one of its most successful years, with production of peaking at 21.2 million metric tons in 2011 alone. Thanks, in no small part, to the amnesty programme which allowed unhindered access to oil and gas operations and activities. (The News, 2012a:49).

In all these short comings how well did the disarmament and demobilization process which the government declared a success go? Lack of facilities, delays of funds, lack of qualified counsellors was all obvious obstacles during demobilization. In disarmament, facts remain that the disarmament that took place was never thoroughly carried out. Ammunitions and weapons surrendered by militants are not commensurate to their number and estimated amount of arms expected. The arms surrendered totalled 1,798 rifles, 1,981 guns of various types, 70 RPGs, 159 pistols, one spear and six cannons (Agbo, 2011). The arms delivered at the designated sites were purported to be new weapons which were purportedly bought by the Niger Delta states governors just to keep the programme going. Within months while the disarmament as completed, MEND set off two car bombs on 15 March, 2010 in Warri where a post amnesty dialogue was being held (The Guardian 2010:1-2) which attests to the fact that the disarmament was not successfully carried out. For the third

batch of the ex-militants, nobody knows when their disarmament occurred but that depends if they were once militants and had guns.

The truth is that amnesty has failed to address the core root causes of the Niger Delta grievances. In his 2009 independence speech, the late President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua stated that "with a view to engendering lasting peace in the area, we proclaimed a general amnesty... on this day and in the spirit of rededication, we renew our commitment to confronting the challenges of critical infrastructure in the Niger Delta, food security, security of lives and properties, human capital development, land tenure and wealth creation" (The Guardian, October 2, 2009). There is no ecological rehabilitation in the amnesty programme and poverty, lack of infrastructure and unemployment is on daily increase. Unfortunately Dan Alabarah, Head of Media Department of the Amnesty Programme in the Presidency stated that their mandate is "to train these former agitators and reintegrate them back to the society. The responsibility of developing the region lies at the doorstep of the Niger Delta Ministry" (Oluokun, 2012:42). This does not only speak of lack of plan for the programme but an open insincerity about government intentions. The position of the Ijaw Foundation that amnesty was not a genuine effort to achieve peace in the Niger Delta because it deliberately failed to address the fundamental causes and issues of the conflict is now being ratified by the government. Also limiting the amnesty indicates the fact that it was not implemented from the Technical Committee's stipulated guidelines thus it has become a policy

summersault. However all these have great consequences because conflict reversion is very costly.

2.1.3 Concept of Conflict

Violence is often the manifestation of an extreme, consistent and intense level of conflict. To this end, Soremekun (2009) says violence is always conflictual, while conflict may not necessarily be violent in an elementary fashion. Violence is harm, perpetrated on persons or property. In the case of persons, it ranges from restraining their freedom of movement to torture and death, and in the case of property, from simple damage to complete expropriation or total destruction (Girvets 1974, p.185). On the same level of analysis, conflict is said to occur where there is interaction between at least two individuals or groups whose ultimate objectives differ (Nicholson 1971 cited in Soremekun 2009).

From the foregoing discussion it is clear that conflict may not necessarily be destructive, but violence, in most cases, is. Furthermore, in most cases, crisis is taken to be synonymous with conflict. Some scholars have often identified crisis with conflict just as some others confuse the term conflict with violence. For example, on a pre-critical level of analysis, Mike Oquaye (1995, p.20 cited in Soremekun 2009) associates, almost rigidly, crisis with conflict. When he says:

Conflict is a sequence of interactions between groups in society, between groups and governments and between individuals. The causes of such interactions, the methods employed and their consequences may lead to conflict...connoting crisis, conflict evokes feelings of tension –fear and insecurity within the state.

Its inherent corollaries include disputations, disagreements, struggle, bad relations, and identification of others as “enemies” or potential enemies.

Crises are structurally differentiated from conflicts. It may be said that both conflict and crisis are vents, but a little application of the rigorous tool of logic expresses clearly the differences between them. Structurally, crisis goes beyond the occurrence or the manifestation or existence of conflict or even violence, but the fact remains that a state of crisis is what comes after a persistent manifestation of incidents of conflict. In other words, crises are states of events after a consistent level of conflict and violence have occurred. They denote a turning point, either for good or bad, after conflict or violence. At such a level of consistent incidences of violence and conflict, what describes the state of events is called a crisis. One could safely conclude that a crisis occurs where a conflict is not safely or promptly managed, it leads to violence while a crisis is the final manifestation of violent conflict.

Deutsch (1973) views conflict as an action, which prevents, obstructs, interferes with, injures or renders ineffective another action with which it is incompatible. For Syth (1990) conflict occurs when the actions or beliefs of one or more members of a group are unacceptable to and, hence, are resisted by one or more groups or members. Conflict is a struggle, between individuals or collectivities, over values or claims to status, power and scarce resources in which the aims of the conflicting parties are to assert their values or claims over those of others. Although this term is often used simplistically and negatively, conflating all conflict with physical violence (Outhwaite and Bottomore cited

in Goodhand and Hume 1999,p.14), conflict can also be seen as having a positive dimension as 'normal forms of social interaction which may contribute to the maintenance, development, change and overall stability of social entities' thus becoming, or continuing to be, physically violent and transforming the conditions that are likely to bring a relapse into violent conflict. In actual fact, conflict connotes disagreement, dispute or controversy in ideas or viewpoints held by two or more individuals or groups. In general terms, and by way of comparison, disputes involve negotiable interests while conflicts are concerned with issues that are not negotiable, issues that relate to ontological human needs that cannot be compromised, such as resource control, marginalization, and environmental degradation as it is the case in the Niger Delta conflict.

On the types and variation of conflicts, Soremekun (2009) identified the following sub types: such as elite conflicts, factional conflicts, communal conflicts, mass conflicts and popular conflicts. Elite conflicts are said to occur within the political centre, when elites of different backgrounds, favouring diverging policy positions, and often pursuing a multiplicity of interests, government, and to influence political decisions as well as specific policies. Communal conflict, on the other hand, is strife posed by a section or some small group of people within a state. Communal conflict challenges the state's territorial integrity and mass confrontations protest the existing distribution of power.

Mass conflict according to Soremekun (2009) is a political movement with the purpose of inducing a rapid, complete, and permanent alteration of the power

structure. By definition, revolutionary conflicts of this sort pose a basic threat to the validity of state power as currently constituted and offer an alternative political vision guided by a clearly defined set of organizing principles. He concluded by averring that popular conflicts as popular political protest chip away at the foundations of state power from below, thereby undermining its viability without altering its form. It constitutes a quiet rebellion against state authority, a way of responding to exclusion and lack of access by limiting the reach of existing central institutions. Popular conflict of this kind emerges most emphatically in conditions where state structures are especially weak and leaders capricious, other patronage network have broken down, where alternative avenues for power accumulation exist and where economic conditions have wrought widespread misery. The next paragraph provides an insight into factors and conditions that make conflict probable, an understanding of which assists in underscoring various drivers and causes of conflict.

The ways in which conflict is conceptualized, and the various types of conflicts that were discussed, it is noted that conflict may not necessarily be destructive, but violence is. The purpose of conflict in some instances may be to show a strain in a relationship, a misunderstanding of another's point of view, and an expression of discontent about the present situation within the context of the Niger Delta conflict, the conflict in the region started as a communal conflict but has evolved into a form of mass mobilization. The metamorphosis of the conflict into a mass conflict constitutes a greater challenge to the state, as the

conflicting parties have now gathered enough power to challenge the hegemony and the claim of the state that it has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

2.2 Empirical Review

2.2.1 Previous Literature on Nature of Amnesty Programme on Peace Building in the Niger Delta

Ikelegbe (2010); Ukiwo (2010); Ako and Okonmah (2009); Isumonah (2005) and a host of other scholars have dealt extensively on the background causes of the conflict. They identified several grievances including the poor state of development; abject poverty in the midst of plenty; absence of basic social amenities; corporate irresponsibility associated with oil companies operations; violence and systematic institution of terror by successive regimes and repressive measures taken against leading spokesperson; flagrant human rights violations; absence of fiscal federalism; denial of access to the benefit from oil derived wealth; environmental degradation and poor welfare programmes; hegemonic politics; divide and rule policies; unemployment; rigging of elections; chieftaincy tussle and corruption as some of the background reasons for the protracted conflicts. The matter was worsened by obnoxious legislations that alienated the people from land ownership and control of resources. Such legislations include, the Petroleum Control Degrees of 1967; the Oil in Navigable Waters Act of 1968; Mineral Oil (Safety) Regulations Law No 45 of 1968; Petroleum Act of 1968; Oil Terminal Dues of 1969; Land Use Act of 1978; Exclusive Economic Zone Act of 1978; Land Title Vesting Decree of

1993 and the National Inland Waterways Authority Decree of 1997 and many others which had vested the entire ownership and control of all population in, under or upon any lands on the Nigerian state (Obi, 2010; Nna-Ntete, 2001).

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Niger Delta Human Development Report issued in 2006 portrays the often cited contradiction of huge oil wealth derivable from the region and the state of development thus:

Its rich endowments of oil and gas resources feed methodically into the international economic system, in exchange for massive revenues that carry the promise of rapid socio-economic transformation within the delta itself. In reality, the Niger Delta is a region suffering from administrative neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor, and endemic conflict (UNDP, 2006:9).

Given unmet goals and the situation pictured above, frustrated youths mobilized resistance movements to disrupt oil production, with the intention to ground the economy to zero level. Protests were so intense, between 1998 and 2009 that the region became a safe haven for insurgents. Between 2006 and 2009 there were over 110 attacks targeted at the oil industry alone. The struggle was consequently hijacked by multiple gangs of militants, cult groups and criminals bands who engaged in underground economy to fund their struggles against the federal government and multinational oil companies. These rampaging militia groups dotted everywhere in the region with impunity posed serious security and economic challenge to the Nigerian state in particular (Ogbogbo, 2011; Osaghae, 2011; Ojakorotu & Whetho, 2008).

Timiebi Koripamo-Agary (cited in Business Day, 2009) media coordinator of the amnesty committee described the exercise as successful. She said the number of militants that accepted the amnesty offer were so many that the committee's capacity was pushed to the limits. Accordingly, with the cooperation of all, including the military, security agencies, the militants, media, the commitment of amnesty officials and Nigerians, the country was able to successfully implement the programme. The huge quantity, quality and sophistication of the arms recovered under the amnesty programme shows that the Niger Delta and Nigeria is a safer place now. It is a huge relief that these weapons have been moved out of the region. With peace returning to the Niger Delta, the youths, the people and security forces will no longer lose their lives in needless conflicts, communities will be peaceful, children can return to school without disruption and the process of rebuilding and development can begin. It is a win-win situation for all (Business Day, 2009).

Swartz (2009) wrote that a high-profile government amnesty program aimed at stopping militants in Nigeria's oil-rich delta region from bombing pipelines are coming under fire for not seeking permanent solutions to the area's underlying problems. The amnesty program, scheduled to begin Thursday and run two months, is the biggest public effort yet by President Umaru Yar'Adua to ease the unrest in the Niger Delta that has cost the country billions of dollars in lost oil revenue. But Nigerian state governors, analysts, and the militants themselves have criticized the plan because it does little to address the core causes of the militancy and criminality that have

plagued the Niger Delta for decades, such as the lack of education, jobs and basic services. State governors from the Niger Delta region, a powerful group but rarely in agreement, last week threatened to withdraw from the amnesty program because it lacked a definite post amnesty plan arrangement for the region.

Alaibe (2011) argued that the Amnesty programme has been a resounding success. I make bold to assert that the programme will go down in history as the sincerest effort by the Federal Government to address the Niger Delta question. You would recall that the late President Umaru Yar'Adua had on June 25, 2009, proclaimed a 60-day unconditional amnesty period for militants in the Niger Delta, as a step towards resolving the protracted insecurity in the region. The terms of the amnesty included the willingness and readiness of militants to surrender their arms, and unconditionally renounce militancy and sign an undertaking to this effect. In return, the government pledged its commitment to institute programmes to assist their disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and provision of re-integration assistance to the ex-militants. In other words, the programme was structured to have three broad components. One, a security component dealing with the disarmament and demobilization of the various militant groups in the Niger Delta; two, an economic component with commitment to provide access to reintegration opportunities for the ex-militants; and three, to promote the economic development of the Niger Delta.

Flowing from this, we proceeded to execute what has become, perhaps, the most successful disarmament exercise in the history of DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) in Africa. By October 2009, (some) 20,192 ex-militants had willingly disarmed, turned in huge cache of arms and ammunition to security agencies and got enrolled in the programme. Going back to your question, I insist that the Amnesty programme has been a resounding success. Where we are currently would be better appreciated when viewed from the pedestal of where we were prior to the amnesty proclamation. Furthermore, let me clarify that while it is true that the late Yar'Adua initiated the Amnesty programme, it is important to place on record that when it seemed that the programme was floundering, it was President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan that revved it up, gave it fresh impetus and provided all that was needed to attain the success that we are talking about today.

Oladoyinbo (2012) argued that, to the people of the Niger Delta region in Ondo State, one of the best things that ever happened to them under this democratic dispensation was the granting of amnesty to the militants that participated in the struggle for their emancipation. For him, Prior to the granting of amnesty by the administration of the late President Umaru Yar'Adua, the region was very volatile with thousands of youths up in arm against the government, arguing that their region was so backward despite being the goose that lay the golden eggs. The youths from various camps and under the control of their leaders threatened oil companies, corporate organizations, wealthy individuals and expatriates among others. Kidnapping,

killing, violence attack, vandalism of oil installations and other vices were the order of the day with all these activities seen as those needed to ensure that government listen to them and address the imbalance in the polity. However, when the agitation got to a stage, government in its wisdom offered amnesty to everybody that took part in the struggle and following consultation and deliberation, the militants agreed to the idea and they surrender their arms and ammunition, signaling the end of the struggle.

Olatoke and Olokooba (2012) examined the amnesty granted to militants of Niger Delta from the legal perspective, questioning the legality of the amnesty programme. He argued that the amnesty programme is yet to be passed into law and as such unconstitutional. Furthermore, he queries if the amnesty programme is a lasting solution to the problem in the region considering the unabated activities of the militants. Finally, he urged the presidency to approach the National Assembly to make law permitting the president to grant amnesty to the militants and other related groups and other related groups who are willing to voluntarily make peace.

Nwachukwu and Pepple (2011) wrote that with the successful disarmament of the militants in the Delta, the federal government, the Niger Delta region and, indeed, the entire Nigerian state has been reaping the gains of the disarmament programme. The first gain of the disarmament programme is that there is a visible reduction in the quantity and volume of arms and ammunition in the region and this has, no doubt, gone a long way in

enhancing national security in the country. The booming of guns in the creeks of the Niger Delta with their harrowing human and economic calamities has been replaced by peaceful environment conducive for normal living and doing business.

Dakolo (2011) argued that Late President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua went all out to confront the problem with all sincerity through the Amnesty initiative in June 2009. When the Federal Government announced the Amnesty programme for the militants not a few persons took it with a pinch of salt. With the Amnesty programme now in full swing and ex militants receiving rehabilitation, reintegration, training and certification at Obubura, Cross River State since June 28th, 2009, it is important that the issues which led them to take up arms, in the first place are frontally addressed. At the last count, over 20,000 militants were said to have thrown in the towel. No doubt, the success of the Amnesty programme is underscored by the large turnout of militants at the various arms collation centres across the Niger Delta and the staggering trench of ammunitions recovered so far.

Equally commendable is the fact that since the commencement of the programme sporadic outburst of violence in the region has been drastically reduced. But the Stakeholders must never rest on their oars as there is still a lot of work to be done. Government and those entrusted with the arduous task of prosecuting the Amnesty programme must be seen to be transparent and credible in discharging their mandate. There is a whole world of difference

between actual militants and miscreants who cash in on the volatility to perpetrate heinous crimes. This group of people should not be included as militants. What is important now is for the ex- militants to be properly and effectively demobilized and adequate training given to them to make them beneficial to the society. But beyond that, there should be a mechanism to ensure that new militants are not created in the future.

Olubayo and Olubisi (2012) noted that without doubt the amnesty programme is expected to improve the human capital development of the country which is presently low. Nigeria's Human Development Index (HDI) value comprising three basic dimension of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living) for 2011 stands at 0.459, positioning the country at 156 out of 187 countries and territories if well implemented, the amnesty programme in Nigeria could serve to negate the 'resource curse' theory that resource-rich economies such as Nigeria, Congo, Angola, etc. are more prone to mismanagement, underdevelopment and violence. According to him, one of the major challenges of the amnesty package is in the area of poor implementation. The amnesty programme was not implemented as recommended in the report of the Niger Delta Technical Committee.

Oscar (2012) opined that the amnesty programme did not make provision for the role of multinational oil corporations who have been accused by environmental activists of fuelling human rights violations and resource

depletion in the region. This feeds into the issues of compensation and victim's protection and livelihoods that need to be addressed. According to him, the lavish expenditures on the amnesty programme have been described in the popular media as a 'political liability' to the Nigerian government. Furthermore, the year 2012 budget proposed a whopping \$450 million to the amnesty programme, which is more than what the government spends to deliver basic education to children.

Oluwaniyi (2011) examined the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme within the context of building peace in a volatile and crisis-ridden Niger Delta region and the implication of the programme for peace in the region. It is generally agreed that the central task of peace building is to create a long term goal of positive peace, a 'stable social equilibrium in which the structural and cultural forces of violence are addressed'. One of the critical means, in fact, the basic tenet for achieving long term goal of peace building in a post-conflict situation is through the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. These are not distinct phases but they constitute part of a seamless web of transition from military to civilian life. The DDR of ex-combatants has become a standard package of measures implemented within the 'peace building' slogan and it incorporates issues bothering on security concerns, management of spoilers, and social and economic recovery of the country concerned.

Akpan and Ering (2010) argued that following the “Success” of the amnesty programme, the federal government quickly released the sum of 50 billion naira to the Presidential Committee on Amnesty (PAC) to begin to implementing the post- amnesty programmes for the repentant militants. However, it is important to note that apart from the 65,000 naira monthly allowance to be paid to each militant and the proposed skill acquisition training programmes for the militants, there is no government whitepaper on how the 50 billion should be spent.

Etekpe (2012) wrote on issue of mismanagement of the programme as the implementation is handled by people who lacked the experience and capacity for negotiation and mediation. Aside, the stakeholders have not been given the opportunity to come together to discuss the best way to achieve DDR. Thus, they too feel alienated. More so, he argued that the amnesty experience is pleasant; it requires the support of all Nigerians. This is important because if the programme fails, the region and country shall not be able to control another round of insurgency and counter-insurgency; he also urged that the pace of implementation of the programme be increased to achieve the desired sustainable development. It has been argued by the highly influential security and intelligence group that the whole idea of granting amnesty to militants in the Niger Delta is part of a broader plan by the ruling people Democratic Party to consolidate its hold on power. Seen from this perspective Amnesty for militants who through acts of political hugger were instrumental to the

electoral victories of some powerful current political office holders (Stratfor, 2009).

Sayne (2012) argued that the Niger Delta has now enjoyed four years of relative calm. However, there is a significant chance the region could see renewed violent conflict in the next one to two years. Dividends from a 2009 amnesty for local militants are real and substantial. Critics of the amnesty claim the program fails to treat the root causes of conflict, is corrupt and unsustainable, and promotes warlords and the spread of organized crime, among other things. These criticisms are not without basis, but they often lack context and balance. Major conflict drivers in the delta are still in place, and no long-term peace plan exists. The coming period likely will bring strong flash points and triggers, particularly around the 2015 presidential and gubernatorial elections. Wavering leadership on security, the closedown of the amnesty program in 2015, decreased support for President Goodluck Jonathan's candidacy, and close electoral results could all lead to violence in the Niger- Delta Region.

At this point, there is no doubt that from the foregoing review, attempts have been variously made by scholars to examine the gains of the amnesty programme via disarmament of Niger Delta militants. However, these efforts, as reviewed above, do not really help determine whether the disarmament of Niger Delta militants has increased crude oil production in Nigeria. Ajaji (2012) observed that when the programme debut in 2009, encomiums were

showered on the late President, at home and abroad for initiating the amnesty, which appeared a respite for the restiveness in the creeks. The amnesty then appeared a major feat at repositioning the economy of the country, which revolves around oil exploration despite the rich untapped potentials in other sectors. However, there were a few 'sceptics' who believed the programme was ill-conceived as it left many questions unanswered. Those sceptics seem to be justified by hindsight. It was not clear, for instance, the enabling law guiding the programme. Apart from the Presidential pronouncement, there is no legislative instrument underlying the amnesty programme to date. In view of the fact that it was more of a political antidote, not many people thought that lack of specific legal basis would pose a challenge. In a constitutional democracy wherein all measures and institutional settings are subject to the dictates of the constitution, the amnesty programme is one step subsumed in discretionary exercise of power. The danger of such exercise of discretion by an Executive Arm of Government already super empowered by the constitution, is manifestly obvious. Instead of the step being duly checkmated and subjected to a strict constitutional order, the National Assembly (NASS) relapsed into the euphoria of a short cut to a national challenge.

Smoke (2009) contended that youth restiveness and community impoverishment in the Niger Delta region was grown out of the mind-set of sharing the available national cake rather than attempting to bake any new cake. For him, the sharing strategy has over time strategically maximized the share made available for individuals outside the economic zones.

Consequently, the zones where the revenue has accrued from have been left impoverished resulting in the situation that now exists in the Niger Delta region. According to him, the actions that gave birth to the pain in the Niger Delta must be reversed in order to remove the pain. He averred that all stakeholders need to be involved in actualizing the implementation of the post amnesty programme and pro activity was recommended as the best strategy for managing the challenges in the Niger Delta.

Eremie and Thom-Otuya (2011) revealed that the Niger Delta militants' disposition against the Federal Government of Nigeria and the oil firms coupled with the international pressures compelled the government to grant the amnesty to the Niger Delta militants. The amnesty deal is a desperate effort by the Nigerian state to end the Niger Delta crisis, and thereby restore some dignity and pride to itself. Furthermore, he therefore examined the nature and character of the amnesty deal, the rationale behind it with the objective to find out reasons why the amnesty deal may not work. He proffered solutions that could help sustain and strengthen the programme for peace to reign in the Niger Delta and Nigeria.

Ibaba (2011) argued that the conditions for violence in the Niger Delta are pervasive, and that the amnesty programme which removed militias from the creeks could be likened to an inchoate operation for removing a cancerous part of a body without containing its further spread or re-emergence. According to the scholar, violence could recur in the region if the frustrations

which support insurgency are not resolve. Resolving these frustrations is therefore a requirement for peace-building in the region. Accordingly, the scholar averred that escaping the frustration aggression trap is predicated on addressing the lack of development, the most fundamental cause of the violence and dealing with oil induced environmental degradation and corruption in governance are the two key issues. For him, therefore, ending oil based degradation is a sure way to improve the living standards, and empower local people through their fishing and farming based occupation, to have adequate access to health and educational services and facilities. To achieve this, environmental laws which are presently weak and suffer poor enforcement will need to be strengthened and enforced adequately. For him, the enforcement of environmental laws and placement of adequate sanctions on MNCs is a sure way to elicit compliance and thus protect the environment. Sabotage spills could be contained by responding to the development challenges of the people, in addition to enforcing the relevant laws dealing with sabotage as an economic crime. The amnesty programme is defective in this regards, as it has isolated the ex-combatants for attention, while neglecting other segments of the population.

Fineman (2010) argued that as part of his determination and desire to put an end to the agitations and violence in the region, the late President also initiated an Amnesty Programme with the aim of disarming, rehabilitating and re-integrating militants into their communities with a promise to tackle head on, the challenges facing the region. The Amnesty Programme was a huge

success as the militants accepted the offer and began coming out of hiding to hand over their arms and ammunition to the government through the peace committee set up to coordinate the programme. At present, the rehabilitation centres have been established and the born-again militants have started the process of rehabilitation. With the amnesty declared a success and the period over, the post-amnesty period is before us and this period is also significant in bringing about lasting peace and development to the region. The effort and determination of the government to achieve these objectives can be seen in the budgetary provisions for the Niger Delta Affairs Ministry in the 2010 budget can benefit from the businesses in the sector. While it is necessary to ensure a conducive business environment in the area, the development of the educational Post -Amnesty collaborative effort Programmes captured between the militancy in the 2010.

Oluwaniyi (2011) argued that deeper analysis indicates that there are challenges ingrained in the programme itself. Firstly, there was no proper planning for the DDR programme. More so, the tenets of the technical committee were not adhered to by the federal government for a bottom- up approach to the programme. Rather, the government collaborated with ex-militants commanders, who were only interested in their personal aggrandizement and did not consult with the militants on the ground. Secondly, the indirect money for weapon approach implemented undermined the quality and success of the programme. Thirdly, much money went towards paying ex-militants commanders, managers of the programme and the surging

number of consultants and contractors to extent that the programme itself is now perceived as being a very lucrative business, rather than a transformational strategy. According to him, many people now form organizations to benefit from the largesse. According to the panel set in January 2010 to review the rehabilitation aspect of DDR, about 80% of the budget had gone on payments to consultants and contractors, leaving just 20% for the rehabilitation of ex-militants.

Egwemi (2010) revealed that the almost wholesale embrace of the amnesty by the repentant militants has been a great relief for Nigerians. For him, the relative peace which the amnesty programme brought to the Niger Delta region needs to be consolidated and all that is required to do this is the necessary political will on the part of the Nigeria's class especially the executive. Such political will according to him, should ordinarily manifest in the form of equitable distribution of revenue derived from the region, a determined effort towards massive infrastructural development, job creation and confidence building measures. Accordingly, such political will should be demonstrated especially in the post amnesty period in form of enabling law to back up the post amnesty programmes.

2.2.2 Previous Literature on Impact of Amnesty Programme on Peace Building in Niger-Delta Region of Nigeria

No doubt, scholars are of the opinion that the amnesty package initiated by President Musa Ya'Adua Administration has brought some level of success that has impacted positively on the lives of the repentant militants in the Niger

Delta. They also agreed on the following impact of the programme. It is a known fact that with the proclamation of the amnesty there seems to be relative peace and security have since returned to the region. Furthermore, the FG has therefore, met with the aim of restoring peace and safety as the nation's economy has return to normal. Consequently, at the height of the conflict in 2009, Nigeria crude production dropped from 2.2 million to 700,000 barrel per day and as a result of the post amnesty period, crude oil production increased from 1.9 to 2.4 million bpd in 2013. In 2014 it also increased to 2.6 million and in 2015 it further rose to 2.7 million (Amaize, 2016).

Additionally, with the declaration and implementation of the amnesty package, ex-agitators who embraced the amnesty offer had since been disarmed, demobilized and are either undergoing training or have been trained in their respective training centres. Presently, it is evident that the Federal Government has so far enlisted 30,000 ex-fighters in the amnesty programme (Onukwugha, Eke-Ogiugo & Okhomina, 2014). The amnesty is supposed to improve the human capital development of the country which is at present low. In a way the programme has presented an opportunity to build capacity of youths as well as reintegrate agitating youths of the Niger Delta into the mainstream in Nigeria as a confidence-building strategy while gradually addressing the root causes that necessitated the conflict in the first place, (Akinwale, 2010; Osah & Amakihe, 2014; Atumah, 2015). If well implemented, Amnesty could serve to negate the "resource curse" theory in

Nigeria that resource-rich economies such as Nigeria, Congo, Angola, etc. are more prone to mismanagement, underdevelopment and violence.

According to Onukwugha, Eke-Ogiugo and Okhomina (2014), amnesty package has helped in the reduction of violent crime as most youths who were involved in anti-social activities have been integrated into the programme thereby making violence unattractive such crimes include; attacking oil installations, engaging in illegal oil bunkering and kidnapping of oil workers. It is however a fact that violence has now declined but not disappeared. To this end, there is no gain saying that amnesty has made significant impact on the socio-economic activities and lives of the people in bringing stability in the Niger Delta. As a result, the remarkable achievements and stability generated considerable goodwill for Nigeria among international partners and friends. Besides, amnesty package rebranded and gave Nigeria a positive image among the comity of Nations (CPED, 2015).

Ogege (2011) argued that whatever benefits that accrue to the people (if at all) only go to the few youths who accepted the amnesty offer, abnegated militancy and surrendered their arms. However, it should be noted that those who renounced militancy constitute a very infinitesimal percentage of the Niger Delta population, so taking them to camp and re-integrating them does not in any way address the problem of underdevelopment in the Niger Delta. The amnesty is silent about the plight of the Niger Delta people that caused and reinforced violent agitations in the region. according to him, the amnesty

initiative, though a different and viable approach to the Niger Delta crisis, is not different from other measures in the sense that it has not been able to provide satisfactory solution to the problem of underdevelopment in the Niger Delta. The amnesty initiative addressed only the symptom and not the cause of the Niger Delta problem

At this point, it is obvious that the extant literature is not bereft of attempts by scholars to examine the implementation of the amnesty programme via demobilization of Niger Delta militants. However, these efforts, as reviewed above, do not help us to determine whether the demobilization of Niger Delta militants has reduced the threats to national security in the region.

Effiong (2011) wrote that President Goodluck Jonathan, represented by Minister of State for Niger Delta Affairs, Hajiya Zainab Ibrahim-Kuchi, declared that the amnesty programme had succeeded well beyond initial expectations. "I make bold to say that after today's event, our great country, Nigeria, will be entering the annals of history as one of few countries in the world that achieved a successful closure to the disarmament and demobilisation phases of its Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration (DDR) programme. Accordingly, the programme indeed saw some challenges right from inception. Observers recall that though the presidential amnesty programme had been viewed with some scepticism at the onset, the situation is quite different today, considering the impact it has made on the circumstances of youths in the region. As attested to by Jonathan, the core

essence of the amnesty proclamation was to stabilise, consolidate and sustain security conditions in the Niger Delta, as a prerequisite for promoting economic development in the area in particular and the nation as a whole. Though Yar' Adua died in office after a protracted illness, the programme remained on course, being vigorously prosecuted by Jonathan, his successor. Accordingly, not many believed that the goals of the programme would be met at some point, recalled Jonathan, who expressed satisfaction that two years after, the programme had aided speedy return of safety, security and sustainable development in the region. We have achieved 80 per cent in this amnesty programme. This is the only DDR programme that is solely funded by the country itself.

Pepple (2012) accessed the reintegration of the militants and state that no fewer than 300 ex-militants from the Niger Delta region were yesterday empowered with business set up materials and finance to start their small and medium scale businesses as part of efforts to reintegrate them into society. The delegates are beneficiaries of empowerment programmes initiated by the Presidential Amnesty Office for ex-militants of the region, which include sales of building materials, electronics, fisheries, super markets. The ex-militants were also urged to learn how to plough back profits into their businesses. According to him, the empowerment scheme was aimed at assisting the trained delegates and equips them to be the new generation of entrepreneur. He recapped the successes of the years past, according to him,

over 13,000 delegates, had been deployed to local and foreign training, skill acquisition and other formal education.

Ogundele (2012) examined the amnesty programme, since its introduction and opined that it has proved to be the panacea for peace in the hitherto restive oil-rich Niger Delta region of the country. The programme, introduced by the late President Umaru Yar'Adua, may not have stopped agitations in the region but has ended the appalling bloodbath and militancy. To that extent, it will be safe to term the programme a success. But three years down the line, what was introduced as an ad hoc measure to tackle a dire security and economic situation has since raised concern by those who feel it is fast becoming a programme in clear danger of being abused. The concern has been spurred by a recent announcement by the Chairman of the Presidential Amnesty Programme, Kingsley Kuku, of an approval for a third batch of 3,642 amnesty beneficiaries. Kuku said that 26,328 ex-militants had been fully disarmed and were undergoing various forms of entrepreneurial training. The latest figure would, therefore, bring the total to close to 30,000 persons. The question however arises as to the direction that the programme is headed and when it is likely to be brought to an end. Or, has it become a permanent instrument for assuaging the rage of jobless Niger Delta youths? In fact, questions are also being raised about the huge cost of running what is becoming an amorphous programme by the Federal Government. These concerns are largely sensible. Last year's budget for the amnesty programme was put in the region of N74 billion and well over N160 billion has been spent since the programme

and offshore. Of this number, 4,929 are being trained offshore, while the balance of 6,382 have either been returned to formal education or have been placed in skill acquisition centres within the country. "Similarly, 6,067 transformed ex-agitators are currently being processed for deployment to reintegration centres (both within the country and offshore) in the fiscal year 2012. The presidential aide said that 113 former militants had been assisted in securing employment in maritime, welding and fabrication companies at home and abroad.

Vice Chairman, Senate Committee on Niger Delta, Senator Nurudeen Abatemi-Usman, expressed satisfaction with the implementation of the programme.

Hear him:

We came here to assess how deep the amnesty programme is. We all know what brought about this programme because Nigeria decided to address a fundamental injustice to a section of the country. From what we have seen and experienced during our interaction with the trainees, I can tell Nigerians that the amnesty programme gives us hope and we are very proud of these youths. The funds allocated to the programme are being judiciously used and we will continue to support and expand its scope (*National Mirror*, 2012: 3).

Confirming the position of Abatemi- Usman, his House opposite number, Hon.

Warman Ogoriba had this to say:

When amnesty was granted, most Nigerians thought nothing good will come out of it. But now the story is different. Our youths are being trained all over the world in critical sectors. We are very impressed and my advice to these young Nigerians is to continue to be good ambassadors of our country (*National Mirror*, 2012: 4).

Jegade (2012) argued that the amnesty programme under the direct supervision of Kingsley Kuku, Adviser to the President on Niger Delta Affairs, remains the most successful intervention programme ever run by the federal government in the Niger Delta region since independence. It should be seen as the most profound effort to tackling the agitation for fairness, equity and development in the oil-rich region. Of recent, I have read several articles on unsubstantiated allegations of embezzlement against the leadership of the Niger Delta Amnesty Office. Some have even suggested that the programme should be stopped on the grounds that Kuku and his team are only enriching themselves from the fund meant for the programme while other wrote that there was nothing to show for the allocations they have received since inception. Such an argument is obviously illogical and cannot be supported by facts on ground. The truth is that today, the amnesty programme has made significant impact in the restoration of peace in the Niger Delta region. President Goodluck Jonathan has received commendation and applause for deeming it fit to ensure the sustenance of the programme started by his predecessor, Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar'Adua.

Former Senate Leader, Senator Victor Ndoma- Egba (SAN), had in an interview noted that it was completely out of place for some Nigerians to be calling for the cancellation of the programme for now. On the argument that too much money is being spent on the programme, the three-term Senator said: "Let us look at the other side of it. What was the country losing when we have militancy? It is easy to do a cost benefit analysis. If what we were losing is far

in excess of what it cost us to get peace then, I think the amnesty programme is justifiable” (National Mirror, 2012). The National chairman of the Foundation for Ethnic Harmony in Nigeria (FEHN), Allen Onyema, while speaking to newsmen on the programme, noted that the programme is celebrated the world over, as the international community seems to be bemused as to how Nigeria was able to get it right from the stage of disarmament, through demobilization to re-integration (National Mirror, 2012).

At this point, it is apparent that efforts have been made to access the benefits of the amnesty programme via reintegration of Niger Delta militants. However, impressive these attempts do not help us ascertain if the reintegration of Niger Delta militants has failed to reduce oil pipeline vandalization. The literature so far reviewed, points to various attempts made by scholars to examine the implementation of the Amnesty programme in terms of disarmament of Niger Delta militants. Scholars such as Swartz (2009) argued that the Amnesty programme lacked a definite post amnesty plan arrangement for the region. Olatoke and Olokooba (2012) questioned the legality of the programme arguing that it is yet to be passed into law and as such unconstitutional. Etekpe (2012) argued that the amnesty is mismanaged by people who lacked the experience and capacity for negotiation and mediation. However, these efforts, as reviewed above, do not really help determine whether the disarmament of Niger Delta militants has increased crude oil production in Nigeria.

Review of extant literature demonstrated that scholars like Ibaba (2011), and Egwemi (2010) argued that, the amnesty initiative via demobilization of Niger Delta militants, though a unique approach, does not have what it takes to answer the Niger Delta question. Aluede (2012) argued that the huge investment approach of the amnesty programme was not in the best interest of Nigerians because it has been implemented to cost several billion naira to benefit a few people who have committed crimes against the state is wrong. However, these efforts, as reviewed above, do not help us to determine whether the demobilization of Niger Delta militants has reduced kidnapping in the region.

2.2.3 Previous Literature on Challenges Encountered in the Implementation of the Amnesty Programme towards peace building in the Niger Delta

Imongan and Ikelegbe (2016) conducted a study on Amnesty Programme in Nigeria: The Impact and Challenges in Post Conflict Niger Delta, Region. The authors observed that the Niger Delta crisis has been a major threat to both socio-economic activities in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The amnesty was now six years since its implementation as at the time of their study. However, their study sought to capture the impact and challenges of the amnesty programme in post conflict Niger Delta region. The qualitative and quantitative method sampling procedure was used for the study. This research study was carried out in Ekeremor Local Government Area of Bayelsa state, Nigeria. The purposive sampling method was used for this research because of the nature of militancy activities in the area. More so, in-depth interview

with youth's leaders, community members, elders and relatives of ex-militants was carried out in the area. According to the authors, for decades, the people of the region have long been neglected, marginalized and lacked the basic infrastructure. Also, the authors stated that the agreement made by the Federal Government remained unfulfilled. Therefore, they advised that there is urgent need for the FG to address the problems in the region. The study concluded that as it stands, the post amnesty needs of the Niger Delta people have not been met and some of the promises made by the Federal Government during the consultation preceding the amnesty have not been redeemed. Therefore, the resolution to the crisis in the region goes beyond amnesty programme to the substantive solution, the solution is for the FG to create employment opportunities for the youths and develop the region.

2.2.4 Gaps in Literature Review

Similar works of Swartz (2009), Olatoke and Olokooba (2012), and Egwemi (2010) all addressed the amnesty programme from the standpoint of the government achieving peace in the Niger Delta region through the instrumentality of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. They have also painted a picture of the amnesty programme costing a lot of money at expense of several other projects begging for attention in several areas of the country. However, the various writers have failed to turn their attention to the diversionary intension in the amnesty scheme which is basically meant to keep the militants and other members of the community busy while the Nigerian ruling elites and their foreign and local business counterparts continue with their business of oil exploitation of the area.

2.3 Theoretical Framework

2.3.1 Theory of the Post-Colonial State by Alavi 1972

This study is principally anchored on the theory of the Post-Colonial State. This theory is imperative to the research because of its effectiveness and merits among other means for the study and understanding of the social system and related phenomena. The theory of post-colonial state was developed by Alavi (1972), and popularized by third world scholars like Ake (1985), Ekekwe (1985) and Ibeanu (1998). The theory suggests that the post-colonial state is a creation of imperialism. As such, it has followed the developmental strategy dictated by the interest of imperialist and its local allies, not by those of the majority of the indigenous population. This post-colonial state has created for itself a deep crisis from which it can hardly extricate itself without fundamentally changing its present nature. According to Ekekwe (1985), the post -colonial state rests on the foundation of the colonial state, this, in turn, had incorporated some important elements of the pre- colonial rudimentary state structures. The main goal of the colonial state was to create conditions under which accumulation of capital by the foreign bourgeoisie in alliance with the ruling elite would take place through the exploitation of local human and other natural resources. It was on this basis that the post-colonial state emerged.

As Ibeanu (1998) has also noted, despite anti-colonial struggles, the post-colonial state altered very little in the arbitrariness of its predecessor. This is especially the case in a country like Nigeria where independence was

negotiated with the colonialists. Negotiated independence, according to him, implied that the structures of the colonial state were not changed in any fundamental sense; it was just a change of personnel. Therefore, the state that now emerged, though ostensibly independent and sovereign, was not only a creature of imperialism, but also sought to dovetail its interest with the foreign bourgeoisie. This is why the Nigerian state consistently protects the interest of the multinational oil companies operating in the Niger Delta as against the interest of the host community.

One basic character of the post-colonial state is that it has very limited autonomy (Ake, 1985). This means that the state is institutionally constituted in such a way that it enjoys limited independence from the social classes, particularly the hegemonic social class, and so, is immersed in the class struggle that goes on in the society. This lack of relative autonomy is one reason why the post-colonial state in Nigeria is incapable of mediating political conflicts (Ake, 1985). In other words, the possibility of resolving contradictions and crises is severely limited. This explains why government efforts (through repression, persuasion, negotiation, pacification) have always failed to resolve the Niger Delta crises.

The post-colonial state is also constituted in such a way that it reflects and caters for a narrow range of interest (Ake, 1985). The post-colonial state as regards the Nigeria state, caters mainly for the interest of the Nigerian bourgeoisie and metropolitan capitalist. Ekekwe (1985) has noted that in any

discussion of the post-colonial state, there is need to consider capital and the state as being closely related. This is because foreign capital plays dominant role in postcolonial states.

The theory of post-colonial state as a tool of analyses is very suitable for explaining and understanding the Amnesty offer granted to the militants in the Niger Delta. When Nigeria is put in its proper neo-colonial state that is not only characterized by low autonomy, but also solely depends on the exploration, export and sale of oil, we begin to understand why the reliance on oil royalties is inevitable and why government resorted to conciliatory approaches such as the Amnesty programme since the use of force to quell the crises has not yielded any positive dividend.

This theory enables us understand that, in as much as there is a symbiotic alliance between the Nigerian state and the multinational oil companies, the interest of the latter, irrespective of the approaches adopted, will always take precedence over the indigenous population. In the light of this, we can see that the granting of the amnesty was borne out, in first instance, for the interest of the foreign capital that wants an increase in the daily production of crude oil, secondly, ensure the security and safety of foreign oil workers. In furtherance of this theory, it is quite obvious that the Nigerian state with regard to the post amnesty programme considers the interest of the indigenous population secondary to enhancing security in the Niger Delta and maximizing oil production. It is within this context that we conclude that the amnesty

programme via Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) granted to Niger Delta militants is not intended to address the political, economic, and socio- environmental problems that are the main drivers of crises in the Niger Delta region in the first place. Rather, the policy was designed to allow the Nigerian state unhindered access to more oil and gas resources in the region. Secondly, ensure the security and safety of foreign oil workers not minding environment and human security. It is important to note that at any point in time that the rulers of Nigeria are denied easy access to oil and gas resources from both the fake and genuine agitators from the region. They simply introduce palliative measures that would immediately remove the obstacle on their way. This is exactly the philosophy behind the Amnesty and Post-Amnesty programme.

3.2 Population, Sample Size, and Sampling Techniques of the Study

The population of the study covered all the adult citizens who are from the age of 20 years and above from the four Niger-Delta states of Bayelsa, Akwa-Ibom Rivers and Delta. The areas covered include the senatorial districts of the four states while the target population for the study includes, state government officials concerned with the management of the amnesty. Other, target population include ex-militants group, community. This target population was chosen because they are the major stake holders in amnesty. However, in selecting the sample size, the study adopted the sample size determination formula in social sciences propounded by Yamane (1967) thus:

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

Where n is the sample size, N is the population size and e is the level of precision (0.05) ² Thus the total population for the Nine local governments is seven hundred and forty eight thousand, seven hundred and thirty three thousand (748,733) people based on 2010 National Population Commission Publication. Applying the formula above, the sample size is determined as thus:

$$n = \frac{748733}{1 + 748733(0.05)^2}$$

$$n = 400.$$

It is therefore means that 400 persons were recognized as the sample size of the study. In view of this 400 questionnaires were administered to the sampled respondents based on the sample size determined above. The questionnaires

administered in each sampled local government area were determined using the following formula:

$$\frac{N_1 \times \text{Total population of each sampled Local Government Area}}{\text{Grand total of the population of the selected Nine LGAs}}$$

Where N_1 = sample size. Therefore:

Sample Size

State	Local Government	
Akwa-ibom	Itu	$\frac{400 \times 64916}{748733} = 35$
	EsitEket	$\frac{400 \times 32218}{748733} = 17$
Rivers	Etche	$\frac{400 \times 129}{748733} = 69$
	Bonny	$\frac{400 \times 119334}{748733} = 64$
	Andoni	$\frac{400 \times 109377}{748733} = 58$
Bayelsa	Brass	$\frac{400 \times 93480}{748733} = 50$
	Sagbama	$\frac{400 \times 94211}{748733} = 50$
Delta	Isoko North	$\frac{400 \times 72672}{748733} = 39$
	Patani	$\frac{400 \times 33328}{748733} = 18$

This gives a total sample size of 400 respondents from the Nine LGAs.

Table 3.1 Table showing the Distribution of the Questionnaire by LGAs

Selected sample state	Selected senatorial district	Selected local government	Population of the study	Target population of the study and sample size				
				Civil servants	Local government officials	Ex-militants	Traditional leaders	Total
Akwa-ibom state	North East	Itu	64916	06	07	15	07	35
	South	Nsit Eket	32218	3	2	09	3	17
Rivers state	East	Etche	129197	15	13	30	11	69
	West	Bonny	119334	09	11	28	16	64
	South East	Andoni	109377	11	10	28	09	58
Bayelsa state	East	Brass	93480	08	09	24	09	50
	West	Sagbama	94211	09	09	25	07	50
Delta state	North	Isoko North	72672	07	08	20	04	39
	South	Patani	33328	03	04	08	03	18
	Total		748733	71	72	185	72	400

Source: National Population Commission, 2016 Reports

In determining the sampling technique used for this study, the researcher took into consideration the fact that the technical nature of the investigation requires the responses of the subject with adequate and related knowledge of the subject matter. To achieve this, Cluster and simple random sampling techniques were employed in the selection of the sampling. The states were grouped into senatorial districts (cluster) and local governments were selected. This was done by adopting the area demarcation done by the National Population

Commission for the purpose of 2006 housing and population census. The respective enumeration areas represented the cluster. A total of 45 clusters were selected, that is 5 clusters from each of the local government using random sampling in each of the selected local government clusters.

In each of the clusters, households were selected in proportion to the total number of buildings in the area through random walk method of sampling i.e at every interval of ten houses. The researcher was able to identify the boundaries of their cluster(s) with the aid of Enumeration Area (E.A) maps design by the National Population Commission. The researcher had followed the E.A description and made sure that all the boundaries of the (E A) were identified.

3.3 Method of Data Collection

In dealing with any real life problem, it is often found that data at hand are inadequate; hence, it becomes necessary to collect data that are appropriate. However, the methods of data collection in this research include the following:

(a) The Questionnaire

The measuring instrument used by the researcher for this investigation is a five point structured Likert-type questionnaire to assess the challenges of development in the Niger delta. The Questionnaire was preferred because of its general simplicity and has a wider reach of the respondents. It provides a standard form of responses for the generality of the target respondents which also makes it easy for analysis. For the purpose of this research the questionnaires were administered personally with the help of nine (9) research

assistants. Some of the research assistants were recruited from the study communities and trained to assist in the administration of the questionnaires. The research assistants were monitored and guided through the study.

However, the questionnaire was structured in two main parts. The first part contains questions seeking demographic information/personal data while the second part seeks data on the relevant variables of the research. The second aspect is constructed in multiple-choice form in order to enable the respondents have it easy to choose from multiple choices. The questions in this part are directly drawn and constructed from the research questions, objectives and hypotheses of the study. They are meant to gather various qualitative and quantitative data for the actual analysis that would give answers to the research questions and also help in discussing and analyzing the hypothesis of the study.

(b) The Interview

Apart from the questionnaire which is the main instrument of data collection, interview guides were also designed to elicit complementary information. These methods were used to gather information from state and federal government officials as well as the Civil Society Groups. In all, a total of 8 respondents were earmarked for the personal interview with 2 from the officials of Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs and Niger-Delta Development Commission both at the National Headquarters in Abuja and Port Harcourt. Other respondents scheduled for interview included another 2 interviewees from traditional and community leaders. The last two (2) came from proactive civil Society Organization “Niger-delta Budget Monitoring Group” whose main objective is to investigate and analyse the activities of Niger-Delta state governments, oil exploration companies, militancy and oil bunkery. The decision to

settle for 36 respondents was based on the desire to restrict the number of interviews to a manageable size that could be reported easily with precision.

Language: The language for the interview was basically English but pidgin English, Etche, uroboh, ikwerre language were used to interpret and obtain responses from the respondent

Although there was no need to the use of "jurat" as responses were not required for presentation or keep as legal documents, care and honor were employed to ensure reliability of information

Both qualitative and quantitative secondary sources were used for data collection in the study. For the quantitative secondary data, time series data on federal government budgetary allocation to Niger-Delta state from 2000-2012 were collected. Data on social indicators of development, such as poverty, unemployment, literacy rate, HDI etc and the various federal government policies and programmes on resource control issues were also collected. The sources and types of secondary data are summarized in the table below:

Table 3.2 Table Showing Type and Sources of Secondary Data

Type	Sources of Data
PUBLICATIONS	1. Publication on the revenue allocation for the Federal account 2. NEITI audit report 3. Oil and gas report from 1999-2012
Data on development project	Various reports of the non-governmental and community based organisations and annual report of oil company and cooperate organisations such as NDDC, UNDP, NNPC, Human Right Watch and Niger-Delta

	Environmental Survey (NDES), the Niger-Delta Budget Monitoring Group as well as economic confidential.
Data on people's reaction to government and oil exploration company	Intense library research from books, journals, articles, unpublished thesis as base line materials
Activities of the militants	Historical documentary source

3.4 Technique for Data Analysis

After the data had been collected, the researcher turned to the task of analysing the data. The analysis of data required a number of closely related operations such as establishment of categories, the application of these categories to raw data through coding, tabulation and then drawing statistical inferences.

In the case of the topic under discussion, descriptive and inferential statistic methods were employed in the analysis of both the primary and secondary data obtained. The quantitative data from the questionnaire was subjected to analysis using Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS version 20). The same process was used by George and Mallery (2001).

The socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the respondents were subjected into percentages in a tabular form. On the other hand, the qualitative data was subjected to qualitative analysis through content analysis with a view to bringing out the thematic view of the respondents through verbatim quotations, forecasting critique and drawing conclusion from the discussion of every relevant information gathered. This test allows inference objectively and systematically identifying the specific characteristics of the struggle.

After analysing the data as stated above, the researcher was in a position to test the hypotheses formulated earlier. Do the facts support the hypotheses or to the contrary? As for this research, Simple Regression analysis was used in testing and measuring both the relationship and significance or otherwise of independent and dependent variables of the study at .05 significant level.

From the models above, the development indexes are proxy by poverty rate, unemployment rate, literacy rate and crude death rate as the dependent variables while Niger Delta Amnesty Programme is the independent variable of the study.

3.5 Justification for Method Used

Given that the aim of the study was to obtain complete and correct data for the study, the researcher adopted a survey research design since it helps to collect reliable data from the source: the respondents, and has the ability to generalize findings from a sample to the entire population. Primary data was collected and used for this study because it helps to elicit complete responses mostly void of window dressing associated with secondary data. Regression analysis was used because it is efficient in ascertaining the relationship between research variables and adequately analyzing phenomena.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Data Presentation

The data collected were described using tables, percentages, mean and standard deviations. To test the hypotheses and answer the research questions, ordinary least square regression analysis was employed to show the effect of Nature of Amnesty Programme on peace building in Niger Delta Region.

Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of data of the first Hypothesis

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. dev	Min	Max
Peace Building	400	4.42134	0.721	1	4
Nature of Amnesty Programme	400	4.1122	0.626	3	5

Source: Researcher's Computation, 2020

Table 4.1 shows the summary statistics of the coded response of the questionnaire from the 400 respondents. The table shows that the average responses for questions on peace building is 4 which is the code for agree. This mean that most of the respondents agree that there are security challenges in Niger Delta Region. The minimum responses were 1 which stand for strongly disagree and the maximum responses was 4 which stand for agree.

Similarly, the responses for questions on Nature of Amnesty Programme has an average response of 4 which shows that most of the respondents agreed to the questions. The standard deviation shows that there are little deviations from the mean responses. The minimum responses were 3 which stand for strongly

undecided and the maximum responses was 5 which stand for strongly agree.

And of the 36 respondents interviewed, Mr. Emeka Nwosu, 31 years said:

In my view the Amnesty programme has addressed substantially the issue of Disarmament.

This represents the views of most youth and in tandem with the finding of the questionnaires administered.

The descriptive statistics of the coded variables on peace building and Amnesty Programme was analyzed in table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Summary Statistics of data on second hypothesis

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. dev	Min	Max
Peace building	400	2.47082	0.599	1	4
Amnesty Programme	400	3.92218	0.41626	3	5

Source: Researcher’s Computation, 2020

Table 4.2 shows the summary statistics of the coded response of the questionnaire from the 400 respondents. The table shows that the average responses for questions on peace building is 2 which is the code for disagree. This means that most of the respondents disagree with the fact that there is adequate security in place in Niger Delta Region. The minimum responses were 1 which stand for strongly disagree and the maximum responses was 4 which stand for agree.

The results of the interviews show that demobilisation of the erstwhile militants only provided temporary peace. One of the interviewee sees the whole process as diversionary.

Table 4.3: Summary Statistics of data on third hypothesis

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. dev	Min	Max
Peace Building	400	4.1152	0.812	1	4
Challenges of Amnesty Programme	400	4.1122	0.116	2	5

Source: Researcher's Computation, 2020

Table 4.3 shows the summary statistics of the coded response of the questionnaire from the 400 respondents. The table shows that the average responses for questions on peace building is 4 which is the code for agree. This mean that most of the respondents agree that there are security challenges in Niger Delta Region. The minimum responses were 1 which stand for strongly disagree and the maximum responses was 4 which stand for agree.

Similarly, the response for questions on Challenges of Amnesty Programme has an average response of 4 which shows that most of the respondents agreed to the questions. The standard deviation shows that there are little deviations from the mean responses. The minimum responses were 2 which stand for undecided and the maximum responses was 5 which stand for strongly agree.

Elder Mazi Ewa, 47 years said:

The programme was laudable but faced with redtapsm
which would hamper the attainment of good result.

He spoke the minds of most of the elders.

Table 4.3: Summary Statistics of data on fourth hypothesis

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. dev	Min	Max
Peace Building	400	4.1152	0.812	1	4
Mitigation of Challenges	400	4.1122	0.116	2	5

Source: Researcher's Computation, 2020

Table 4.3 shows the summary statistics of the coded response of the questionnaire from the 400 respondents. The table shows that the average responses for questions on peace building is 4 which is the code for agree. This mean that most of the respondents agree that there are security challenges in Niger Delta Region. The minimum responses were 1 which stand for strongly disagree and the maximum responses was 4 which stand for agree.

Similarly, the response for questions on Mitigation of Challenges of the Amnesty Programme has an average response of 4 which shows that most of the respondents agreed to the questions. The standard deviation shows that there are little deviations from the mean responses. The minimum responses were 2 which stand for undecided and the maximum responses was 5 which stand for strongly agree.

Here also are the results of those interviewed which shows that Amnesty programme has not substantially addressed the issues of poverty and environmental degradation.

4.2.1 Nature of Amnesty Programme and Peace building in Niger Delta Region

The ordinary least square Regression was used to test the hypothesis one on the effect of Nature of Amnesty Programme on peace building in Niger Delta Region.

Table 4.5: Regression result for hypothesis one

Peace Building	Coef.	Std. Err	T	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Nature of Amnesty Programme	0.6126	0.1635	3.75	0.003	0.1220	0.01141
_cons	3.7112	0.1144	32.44	0.000	4.12117	5.23219

Source: Researcher's Computation, 2020

From the results above, it shows that Nature of Amnesty Programme has positive effect on peace building in Niger Delta Region. This effect is insignificant at 5% level of significance, since the p-value is greater than 0.05. This finding shows inadequate statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis two of the study, so the alternative hypothesis cannot be adopted, finalizing that Nature of Amnesty Programme has a positive but insignificant effect on peace building in the Niger delta region of Nigeria.

4.2.2 Amnesty Programme and Peace building in Niger Delta Region

The Ordinary least square Regression was used to test the effect of Amnesty Programme on peace building in Niger Delta Region.

Table 4.6. Regression result for hypothesis two

Peace Building	Coef.	Std. Err	T	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Amnesty Programme	0.0806	0.0635	1.27	0.015	0.2054	0.044111
cons	2.78708	0.25044	11.13	0.000	2.29507	3.27909

Source: Researcher's Computation, 2020

From the results above, it shows that Amnesty Programme has positive effect on peace building in Niger Delta Region. This effect is insignificant at 5% level of significance, since the p-value is greater than 0.05. This finding shows

inadequate statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis two of the study, so the alternative hypothesis cannot be adopted, finalizing that Amnesty Programme has a positive but insignificant effect on peace building in the Niger delta region of Nigeria.

4.2.3 Challenges of Amnesty Programme and Peace building in Niger Delta Region

To test the hypothesis and answer the research questions on Challenges of Amnesty Programme and peace building in Niger Delta Region, the ordinary least square regression analysis was employed. This is to show the effect of Challenges of Amnesty Programme on peace building in Niger Delta Region.

Table 4.7: Regression result for hypothesis three

Peace Building	Coef.	Std. Err	T	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Challenges of Amnesty Programme	-0.8512	0.5615	-4.75	0.000	0.1220	0.01141
_cons	3.7112	0.4224	33.44	0.000	4.12117	5.23219

Source: Researcher’s Computation, 2020

From the results above, it shows that Challenges of Amnesty Programme has negative effect on peace building in Niger Delta Region. This effect is significant at 5% level of significance, since the p-value is less than 0.05. This finding shows adequate statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis three of the study, so the alternative hypothesis can be adopted, finalizing that Challenges of Amnesty Programme has a negative and significant effect on peace building in the Niger delta region of Nigeria.

4.2.4 Mitigation of Challenges and Peace building in Niger Delta Region

To test the hypothesis and answer the research questions on Mitigation of Challenges and peace building in Niger Delta Region, the ordinary least square regression analysis was employed. This is to show the effect of Mitigation of Challenges on peace building in Niger Delta Region.

Table 4.8: Regression result for hypothesis three

Peace Building	Coef.	Std. Err	T	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Mitigation of Challenges	0.4221	0.5615	3.11	0.000	0.1220	0.04117
cons	0.8412	0.2213	41.21	0.000	8.0361	6.33214

Source: Researcher's Computation, 2020

From the results above, it shows that Mitigation of Challenges has positive effect on peace building in Niger Delta Region. This effect is significant at 5% level of significance, since the p-value is less than 0.05. This finding shows adequate statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis four of the study, so the alternative hypothesis can be adopted, finalizing that there are ways by which the challenges encountered by the amnesty programme on the peace building activities can be mitigated in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria.

4.3 Discussion of Findings

Firstly on the nature of amnesty programme in peace building in the Niger Delta region, the data collected from the questionnaire and interviews conclude that the nature of amnesty programme include information collection and operation planning for militants in Niger-delta of Nigeria, Weapons collection and retrieval operation in Niger-delta of Nigeria, Firearms stockpile management in Niger-delta of Nigeria, Destructions of weapons and

ammunition in Niger-delta of Nigeria, Registration and documentation of weapons in Niger-delta of Nigeria, Provide health screening of ex-combatants for illness or disabilities in Niger-delta of Nigeria, Pre-discharge orientation from militants to civilians of Nigeria, provision of economic benefit through education and vocational training for militants in Niger-delta of Nigeria, provision of information, counselling and rehabilitation of militants into the society in Niger-delta of Nigeria, and that Amnesty is predicated on the willingness and readiness of the militants to give up all illegal arms in their possession completely renounce militancy in all its ramifications unconditionally in Niger-Delta of Nigeria. Furthermore, from the test of hypothesis one, the Nature of Amnesty Programme was found to have a positive effect but insignificant effect on peace building in the Niger Delta Region. This finding of insignificance is consistent with the finding of Ogundele (2012) who concluded that “the programme may not have stopped agitations in the region but has ended the appalling bloodbath and militancy. Also to that extent, it would be safe to term the programme a success but three years down the line, what was introduced as an ad hoc measure to tackle a dire security and economic situation has since raised concern by those who feel it is fast becoming a programme in clear danger of being abused”, implying that the programme’s effectiveness has not been a perfect one but a positive, yet insignificant one since peace has not been built. Furthermore, the finding is consistent with the theory of the Post-Colonial State by Alavi (1972).

Secondly, for the hypothesis two on the effect of Amnesty Programme on peace building in Niger Delta Region, the study found that Amnesty Programme has a positive but insignificant effect on security in the State. This finding implies that Amnesty Programme may increase peace building if continued but the increase will be insignificant as if nothing has happened. This finding is further espoused by the interview responses which sum that Amnesty programme through disarmament, demobilization and re-integration of militants have impacted peace in Niger-Delta region of Nigeria, including socio-economic activities and living standards of the people. The respondents also added that violent crimes have reduced as most youths who were involved in anti-social activities have been integrated into the programme thereby making violence unattractive. However, the interviewees also implied that the impact of amnesty programme on peacebuilding has not been perfect as there are still issues around the area as well as possible looming threats due to recently poor living conditions around the country as can be seen through unemployment and inflation rates that are shooting up.

Results of the interview show a substantial agreement with the responses of the administered questionnaire. It interviewer pointed out that the amnesty programme was conceived without the stakeholders input. It was an imposed solution based on the thinking of the governments.

Also that the beneficiaries of the programme are the children of those in government and their relatives. It was also opinion the programme ushered only temporary calm and not peace. The finding of the hypothesis two of this

study is therefore in disagreement with Effiong (2011) who opined that Nigeria will be entering the annals of history as one of few countries in the world that achieved a successful closure to the Nature of Amnesty Programme and demobilisation phases of its amnesty programme because even if the study found a positive effect, it was not as guaranteeing as the views of Effiong (2011) since the effect of this study was found to be insignificant based on analyses of questionnaire and opinions from the reputable interviewees. This finding is also consistent with the only theory adopted by the study, which is the theory of the Post-Colonial State by Alavi (1972).

Thirdly regarding the challenges of the amnesty programme, the researcher summed from the interviews that the challenges of Amnesty programme in the region include the fact that many terms and agreement reached before the militants laid down their arms have not been met by the Federal Government, Unemployment rate is still very high in the region, there have been no compensation for conflict affected communities and victims, many of the youths who returned from training abroad up till now have not been empowered or engaged, corruption and greed on the part of the management of the programme, and the funds meant for the ex-militants are either not directly paid to them or short charged. Furthermore, from the statistical test of the third hypothesis on the effect of Challenges of Amnesty Programme on peace building in Niger Delta Region, it was found that Challenges of Amnesty Programme has negative and significant effect on peace building in Niger Delta Region. This implies that if the challenges continue, peace building efforts will

be significantly demeaned. The finding of the study is consistent with that of Imongan and Ikelegbe (2016) who concluded that the needs of the Niger Delta region has not yet been met despite the amnesty agreements. The finding is also in line with that of Ogege (2011) who argued that those who renounced militancy constitute a very infinitesimal percentage of the Niger Delta population, so taking them to camp and re-integrating them does not in any way address the problem of underdevelopment in the Niger Delta. Furthermore, the finding is also consistent with the theory adopted by the study, which is the theory of the Post-Colonial State by Alavi (1972).

Finally, the test of hypothesis four of the study shows that there are ways by which the challenges encountered by the amnesty programme on the peace building activities can be mitigated in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. This finding is also in line with that of Imongan and Ikelegbe (2016) made recommendations as to how the government can make better lasting impact in the region.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 Summary

This study examined the effects of the amnesty programme on peace building in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria and the thesis answered four research questions and attained four objectives, as well as it tested four hypotheses which were advanced in the introductory chapter one. In chapter two, the literature review was done in three main sections; the conceptual review, the empirical review and the theoretical review. In the conceptual review, the study addressed the concept of peace building, conflicts and amnesty programme as well as the amnesty components including Nature of Amnesty Programme, Amnesty Programme and Challenges of Amnesty Programme. For the empirical review, studies by various authors on amnesty and peace building were reviewed. Finally, the Theory of the Post-Colonial State was adopted reviewed in line with the study.

In chapter three, the methodology adopted for the study was discussed. The research design adopted was the survey design. The samples used for the study were 400 randomly selected respondents that cut across the Niger Delta Region and the analysis was done using both descriptive statistics and inferential statistics. The descriptive tools used were tables and percentages while the inferential tool was the ordinary least square regression analysis, since the study is looking at the cause-effect relationship.

In chapter four, the hypotheses were tested and the results showed that Amnesty Programme and Nature of Amnesty Programme had positive but insignificant effects on peacebuilding in the Niger Delta Region, while Challenges of Amnesty Programme had a negative and significant effect on Amnesty Programme, and mitigation of challenges has a positive and significant effect on peace building in Niger Delta Region. These findings were discussed in line with interview findings, empirical and theoretical review of similar studies on amnesty and peace building.

5.2 Conclusion

The main objective of this study was to examine the effect of the amnesty programme on peace building in Niger Delta Region. The components of the amnesty programme used as proxies are Nature of Amnesty Programme, Amnesty Programme and Challenges of Amnesty Programme. From the data collected and the analysis done on those data, it was found that all the variables used (Nature of Amnesty Programme, Amnesty Programme, Challenges of Amnesty Programme and mitigation of the challenges) have positive and insignificant, positive and insignificant, negative and significant, and positive and significant effects respectively on peace building in Niger Delta Region. Thus, it can be concluded that amnesty programme has an insignificant effect on peace building in Niger Delta Region.

5.3 Recommendations

The major aim of every study is to make relevant recommendations to improve the phenomenon studied and this study is not an exception. Considering the

findings of the study and conclusions that arises from it, the following recommendations are made:

- i. The Federal Government of Nigeria needs to make intensified efforts to improve the continued implementation, monitoring and periodic control of the Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. This would help improve the positive effect of the programme to a point where it would become statistically significant to the peace building efforts in the region.
- ii. Secondly, the federal government should collaborate closely with the state governments in the Niger Delta Region of the country to improve the Amnesty Programme such that it is done properly as well as done to its intended level and standard. This would help to improve the effect of Amnesty Programme to a statistically significant and positive effect that would contribute better to peace building efforts in the Niger Delta Region of the Country.
- iii. Finally regarding the Challenges of Amnesty Programme, the federal government also in collaboration with the state governments of the region should ensure that program is carried out seamlessly in a way that the participants must have been thoroughly screened for the required and genuine change of heart towards violent tendencies in order to have better and statistically significant and positive results towards peace building.

- iv. The Federal Government of Nigeria should ensure that all amnesty agreements that were made are strictly adhered to in terms of payments, empowerment, job creation, compensation of affected individuals and communities and intensive follow up of beneficiaries of the amnesty programme.

5.4 Suggestion for Further Studies

The study was conducted to assess the effects of the amnesty programme on peace building in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria using primary data and questionnaire as the major tool for data collection. The study therefore recommends that further studies be conducted into the impacts of programmes similar to the amnesty programme such as the one conducted between the Federal Government and the Boko Haram group, employing both primary and secondary data in its analyses to assess its effects on peace building in Northern Nigeria.

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RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

ASSESSMENT OF PEACEBUILDING ACTIVITIES IN THE NIGER DELTA AMNESTY PROGRAMME

Dear Respondent,

Please feel free to give your candid opinion as you fill this questionnaire, which is designed for academic research purpose on Assessment of the Amnesty programme and peace building activities of the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria.

Do not leave any question unanswered. Please be assured that your view and perceptions shall be treated with absolute confidentiality.

INSTRUCTIONS: Please tick your response to each of the items below

SA - 5	A - 4	UD - 3	D - 2	SD - 1
strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree

S/ N	What is the nature of Amnesty programme in peacebuilding in Niger Delta of Nigeria	SA	A	UD	D	SD
1	Information collection and operation planning for militants in Niger-delta of Nigeria					
2	Weapons collection and retrieval operation in Niger-delta of Nigeria					
3	Stockpile management in Niger-delta of Nigeria					
4	Destructions of weapons and ammunition in Niger-delta of Nigeria					
5	Registration and documentation of weapons in Niger-delta of Nigeria					
6	Provide health screening of ex-combatants					

	for illness or disabilities in Niger-delta of Nigeria					
7	Pre-discharge orientation from militants to civilians of Nigeria					
8	Provide economic benefit through education and vocational training for militants in Niger-delta of Nigeria					
9	Provide information counselling and rehabilitation of militants into the society in Niger-delta of Nigeria					
10	Amnesty is predicated in the willingness and readiness of the militants to give up all illegal arms in their possession completely renounce militancy in all its ramifications unconditionally in Niger-Delta of Nigeria					

S/ N	What is the impact of amnesty programme on peacebuilding in Niger Delta of Nigeria?	SA	A	UD	D	SD
11	Amnesty programme through disarmament of militants have impacted peace in Niger-Delta of Nigeria					
12	Amnesty programme through demobilization of militants impacted peace in Niger-Delta of Nigeria					
13	Amnesty programme through reintegration of militants to civilians imparted peace in Niger-Delta of Nigeria					
14	Amnesty has made significant impact on the socio-economic activities and lives of the people in bringing stability in the Niger Delta					
15	Amnesty package has helped in the reduction of					

	violent crime as most youths who were involved in anti-social activities have been integrated into the programme thereby making violence unattractive					
16	Weapons collection from militants group imparted peace in Niger-Delta of Nigeria					
17	Information collection from militant group promote peace in in Niger-Delta of Nigeria					
18	Destructions of weapons and ammunition ensure peace in Niger-Delta of Nigeria					
19	Stockpile management of weapons ensure peace in Niger-Delta of Nigeria					
20	Provide health screening of ex-combatants for illness or disabilities in Niger-delta promote peace					
21	Pre-discharge orientation from militants to civilians ensure peace in Niger-Delta of Nigeria					
22	Provide economic benefit through education and vocational training for militants ensure peace in Niger-delta of Nigeria					
23	Implementation of the amnesty package, ex-agitators who embraced the amnesty offer had since been disarmed and demobilized which Promote Peace					

S/ N	What are the challenges facing the implementation of amnesty programme in Niger-Delta of Nigeria	SA	A	UD	D	SD
24	Terms and agreement reached before the militants lay down their arms have not been met by the Federal Government					

25	Unemployment rate is still very high and most of the youths are not employed			
26	There is no compensation for conflict affected communities and victims			
27	Most of the youths who returned from training abroad up till now have not been empowered or engaged			
28	Corruption and greed on the part of the management of the programme			
29	Most of the ex-militants have not been trained by Amnesty Officer			
30	Some group of militants were excluded from the amnesty benefits			
31	The funds meant for the ex-militants are not directly paid to them, and in most cases they are short charged			